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Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between fear and privacy by using the Extended
Parallel Process Model (EPPM) to examine whether there is an association between fear appeals
and the willingness to allow increased governmental surveillance of online and phone
communications. Research suggests that, in the United States, privacy is important. Moreover,
courts have inferred privacy rights in the U.S. Constitution, including protection from intrusions
by the government. However, the threat of terrorism is also very real. There are indications that
some people may be willing to allow intrusion by the government if it means keeping them safe.
This study uses an experimental method to determine whether the fear of terrorism is stronger
than the need to keep private communications secure from the government. EPPM is a dominate
theory in the area of fear appeals and persuasion. Scholars indicate that the EPPM can predict
whether a persuasive message will be successful based on the levels of threat and efficacy. The
underlining assumption of the theory is that if a person feels fear, that person will take some sort
of action to alleviate the fear. EPPM research suggests that, in order to persuade, a fear appeal
message must contain language that accentuates a high threat and high efficacy to combat the
threat. According to the theory, if a person perceives a high threat and high efficacy (i.e., feels he
or she has the ability to overcome the threat by taking the action proposed in the message), that
person will be persuaded by the message. EPPM is used primarily in the field of health
communication; however, this study takes a unique route by using EPPM to study attitudes and
behaviors toward terrorism and privacy rights policies. This study used terrorism as the threat
and offered two separate efficacy options. The first was allowing increased government
surveillance, and the second was individual reporting of suspicious activity to police. This study
found no support for the EPPM hypotheses, meaning there was no indication that participants

who read the fear appeal containing the high threat and high efficacy options were persuaded by
the message. However, the results did offer evidence that a high pre-existing perception of the
threat could make a fear appeal ineffective. The perceived terrorism threat severity level for all
of the experimental groups, including the control group, were high, which left little room for the
threat to be increased using a fear appeal. EPPM proposes that, in order to be persuaded, the
perceived efficacy felt by the reader of the message must be able to surpass the perceived threat.
In this case, it is likely that the perceived threat of terrorism is so high that the efficacy options
provided could not overcome the threat. Moreover, the results provided evidence that type of
efficacy offered in the fear appeal message is important.
This study also extends EPPM research by determining if there is a relationship between
cognitive dissonance and rejection of a fear appeal message. Cognitive dissonance refers to
inconsistencies between an individual’s beliefs and actions. The theory proposes that if an
individual has an inconsistency in her beliefs and behaviors, it can lead to discomfort. The
individual will want to alleviate the discomfort by reducing the dissonance, which could mean
either changing beliefs or behaviors to make them consistent.
This study proposed that the amount of dissonance a person feels when reading a fear
appeal may affect whether the person accepts or rejects the message. The results showed that
cognitive dissonance is a predictor of message rejection. The higher the amount of cognitive
dissonance the participant felt when reading the fear appeal message, the more likely that
participant was to reject the message. In fact, the results indicated that cognitive dissonance is a
better predictor of message rejection than perceived threat and perceived efficacy combined.
This finding suggests that cognitive dissonance should be considered when drafting a fear appeal
message and that it should be included as a variable in the EPPM theoretical model.

Finally, this study investigated the relationship between cognitive dissonance and the
privacy paradox theory. The privacy paradox theory refers to an inconsistency between a
person’s beliefs and behaviors about privacy. The results indicated that there is a relationship
between dissonance and the privacy paradox.

Privacy vs. Security: Fear appeals, terrorism and the
willingness to allow increased government surveillance
by
Angela M. Rulffes
B.S., Plattsburgh State University, 2002
M.S., Syracuse University, 2003
J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 2009

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Mass Communication.
Syracuse University
May 2017

Copyright © Angela M. Rulffes 2017
All Rights Reserved

Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... i
Case Index .................................................................................................................................................. viii
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 8
Part 1: Privacy rights then and now .......................................................................................................... 8
Tort Privacy ........................................................................................................................................... 9
Protection from governmental intrusion ............................................................................................ 11
Technology, new media and privacy................................................................................................... 13
Privacy, governmental surveillance and terrorism ............................................................................. 16
Privacy vs. Data Security ..................................................................................................................... 23
Part 2: Conceptualization of privacy and its relationship to government surveillance .......................... 25
Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundation ............................................................................................................. 31
Extended Parallel Process Model............................................................................................................ 32
Cognitive Dissonance .............................................................................................................................. 43
Chapter 4: Method...................................................................................................................................... 50
Participants and procedure..................................................................................................................... 50
The fear appeal message ........................................................................................................................ 53
Measures................................................................................................................................................. 57
Chapter 5: Results ....................................................................................................................................... 67
Manipulation and Validity Checks .......................................................................................................... 67
Hypotheses and Research Question Testing........................................................................................... 70
Hypothesis 1........................................................................................................................................ 71
Research question 1 ............................................................................................................................ 72
Hypothesis 2........................................................................................................................................ 73
Research Question 2 ........................................................................................................................... 74
Hypothesis 3........................................................................................................................................ 75
Research Questions 3 and 4 ................................................................................................................ 76
Research Question 5 ........................................................................................................................... 77
Hypothesis 5........................................................................................................................................ 87
Chapter 6: Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 88
vi

EPPM ....................................................................................................................................................... 88
Privacy ..................................................................................................................................................... 93
Cognitive Dissonance ............................................................................................................................ 101
Dissonance, Privacy Concern and the Privacy Paradox .................................................................... 106
Limitations and threats to validity ........................................................................................................ 109
Chapter 7: Conclusion and future research .............................................................................................. 111
Appendices................................................................................................................................................ 116
Appendix A: Measures .......................................................................................................................... 116
Appendix B: Fear appeal message ........................................................................................................ 124
References ................................................................................................................................................ 144
Vita ............................................................................................................................................................ 155

vii

Case Index
Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 802 (2d Cir. 2015)……………..……7, 8, 21
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)…………………………………………...16, 19, 21, 100
Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974)…………………………………….26
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)…………………………………………...6, 14, 15, 16
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)……………………………………………………... 16
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)…………………………………………………….21
Olmstead v. United States, 222 U.S. 438 (1928)………………………………………….6, 12, 14
Palmieri v. United States et al., No. 1:2012cv01403 (D.D.C 2016)………………………...18, 19
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 69 L.R.A. 101, 122 Ga. 190 (Ga. 1905)……………… 12
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)…………………………………………………..17, 95
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)………………………………………………………...16
United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2007)…………………………………………17
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)…………………………………………………...15
United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007)…………………………………...17
United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004)…………………………………………...17
United States v. Meregildo, 883 F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)…………………………...18, 19
Wikimedia Foundation v. National Security Agency, 2016 WL 703452
(C.A.4)…..………………………………………………………………………….7, 8, 10, 21, 30

viii

1

Chapter 1: Introduction
In the United States, privacy is considered an important constitutional right, and there are
indications that citizens value protection against intrusions by the government. In June 2013,
when Edward Snowden released information about PRISM, a U.S. government surveillance
program, there was public concern about possible privacy violations (Florek, 2013; Palmer,
2013). More recently, issues of privacy and governmental intrusion surfaced when the Federal
Bureau of Investigation sought to gain access to a locked iPhone (Benner & Lichtblau, 2016). In
both the PRISM and iPhone cases, the government indicated that its concern was national
security and protection from terrorist attacks (Florek, 2013; Palmer, 2013; Selyukh &
Domonoske, 2016). The government has an expectation that the interception of terrorist
communication will help protect U.S. citizens (Florek, 2013).
Although privacy from governmental intrusion is an important issue, the threat of
terrorism is also very real. In some instances, people may be willing to allow intrusion by the
government if it means keeping them safe. This study examines the effects of the fear of
terrorism on people’s attitudes toward governmental surveillance. The purpose of this study is to
test the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) to discover if fear appeals will cause people to
be more likely to give up privacy rights and allow intrusive governmental surveillance in order to
ensure national security. Moreover, this study will examine the extent to which cognitive
dissonance regarding the fear appeal affects how people react to it.
In 1928, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said in his dissenting opinion that the
right to be let alone is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men” (Olmstead v. United States, p. 478). Nearly 40 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that the Fourth Amendment includes a right to privacy in Katz v. United States
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(1967). Since that time, there have been many lawsuits arguing that governmental intrusion has
led to violation of constitutional privacy rights.
In June 2013, leaks by Edward Snowden led to the discovery of three NSA surveillance
programs, which have since led to a variety of law suits. One of the programs, PRISM, was
designed by United States and British governments to gather intelligence pertaining to terrorist
activities in an effort to enhance national security (Blass, 2014; Florek, 2013). According to
reports, the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) gained access to the central
servers of significant media and social networking companies including Facebook, Google and
Apple (Blass, 2014; Florek, 2013). Through this access, the government was able to extract
information such as photos, emails, connection logs, audio and video chats, and other stored data
(Blass, 2014; Florek, 2013). A second program involved the NSA’s upstream collection of
communications (Blass, 2014). This program allowed the NSA to monitor and seize internet
communications without a warrant (Wikimedia v. NSA, 2016). Because this program allowed for
the bulk capturing, copying and searching of the content of international and domestic internet
communications, there were people who argued that upstream surveillance violated privacy
rights (Wikimedia v. NSA, 2016). These concerns about privacy violations have led legal
challenges to the NSA’s program (Wkimedia v. NSA, 2016). A third program code-named
XKeyscore collected the information that the NSA was mining and aggregated it into a database
in order to search and analyze the information (Blass, 2014; Florek, 2013).
These surveillance programs were authorized under the 2008 Amendments to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1974, which allowed the NSA to gather foreign
intelligence information by targeting people located outside of the United States (FISA, 2008;
Florek, 2013). The “Limitations” section of the statute states that the government cannot
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“intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United
States” and cannot “intentionally acquire any communication” where the sender and all
recipients “are known at the time of acquisition to be locate in the United States” (FISA, Section
702, 2008; Florek, 2013). However, the language of the law leaves open the possibility that the
NSA many collect communications of U.S. citizens when they are receiving or sending
communications to an NSA target (Eoyang, 2016). There has been much debate over whether the
PRISM, Upstream surveillance, and XKeyscore programs violated U.S. citizens’ Fourth
Amendment privacy rights. For example, after The Guardian and The Washington Post broke the
story regarding the NSA’s surveillance programs, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
filed two lawsuits. The first, ACLU v. Clapper (2015), challenged the NSA’s ability to mass
collect phone records of U.S. citizens (ACLU v. Clapper – Challenge to NSA, 2015). The second
suit, Wikimedia v. NSA (2016), argued that the NSA’s mass interception of U.S. citizens’
international online communications was unconstitutional (Wikimedia v. NSA – Challenge to
Upstream Surveillance, 2015). In ACLU v. Clapper (2015), the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found that the NSA’s collection of phone records was not authorized by Section 215 of
the Patriot Act, which the government had cited as statutory legal basis for the program. The
court did not determine whether there was a privacy violation under the Fourth Amendment
(ACLU v. Clapper, 2015). The Wikimedia case was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland and as of this writing is under appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit (Wikimedia v. NSA – Challenge to Upstream Surveillance, 2015). It is important
to distinguish data collections from content collection. ACLU v. Clapper was arguing that the
collection of phone records, consisting primarily of phone numbers dialed and received, was
unconstitutional. In that case, there were no allegations that the actual content of phone calls was
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being overheard using surveillance. Wikimedia v. NSA also involves the collection of data;
however, the ACLU also argued that the NSA copies the communications it collects and
“reviews the copied communications – including their full content – for instances of” email
addresses, phone numbers and other identifiers for NSA targets (Wikimedia v. NSA, 2016, p. 13).
While data collection is an issue, there is more of a concern with the capture and search of the
content of communications. However, top security researcher Bruce Schneier, a fellow at
Harvard’s Berkman center, said that metadata contains highly sensitive information. Schneier,
along with fellow computer and data science experts, joined an amicus brief on behalf of the
ACLU in the Clapper case because of his concerns about the government’s collection of
telephone metadata (Schneier, 2014). Schneier states that “metadata equals surveillance data, and
collecting metadata on people means putting them under surveillance” (Scheiner, 2014).
More recently, issues of privacy and governmental intrusion came up when the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sought to gain access to a locked iPhone (Benner & Lichtblau,
2016). According to an article in the New York Times, Apple argued that this action could have
negative ramifications on the right to privacy against governmental intrusion (Benner &
Lichtblau, 2016). After the murder of 14 people in San Bernardino, California in December,
2015, the FBI obtained an iPhone used by one of the attackers (Benner & Lichtblau, 2016;
Selyukh & Domonoske, 2016). The issue, however, was that the phone was encrypted (Benner &
Lichtblau, 2016; Selyukh & Domonoske, 2016). The only way for the FBI to access the
information on the phone would be get around the phone’s passcode security feature; however,
Apple refused to help the government because the company said such a tool could be used to
breach other electronic devices, which could allow the government to violate peoples’ privacy
(Benner & Lichtblau, 2016; Selyukh & Domonoske, 2016).
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The particular interest of this study is to discover if a fear appeal might persuade people
to allow the government to intrude on their personal lives. Fear can be a strong motivator.
Indeed, studies indicate that fear can lead people to change their attitude and behavior (Rogers,
1983; Witte, 1994; Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). Currently, EPPM is one of
the predominate theories in this area. Scholars indicate that the theory can predict whether a
persuasive campaign will be successful based on the levels of threat and efficacy (Witte, 1994;
Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). EPPM suggests that people process fear
appeals both cognitively and emotionally and uses these variables to determine whether a
persuasive campaign will be successful (Witte, 1994). Scholars often use EPPM to study the
effects of health communications and motivations to live healthier lifestyles. There are few
EPPM studies that focus on non-health-related issues and none that examine the threat of
terrorism. This study takes a unique route by using EPPM to study attitudes and behaviors
toward terrorism and privacy rights policies. Moreover, though EPPM studies have varied the
level of efficacy, none have attempted to investigate and compare two different efficacy options
in response to the same threat. This study addresses gaps in the research by using EPPM to
examine attitudes and behaviors toward terrorism. In addition, no studies have examined whether
cognitive dissonance might play a role in predicting message acceptance and message rejection.
This study addresses that gap in the research as well.
Social scientists and psychologists tend to focus studies about privacy on issues of
boundary building (Altman, 1976; Petronio, 2002) and self-disclosure (Trepte & Reinecke, 2011,
Westin, 2003). These scholars have proposed theoretical frameworks to help understand how
people determine what should be private and how they control what information they share with
others. In addition, legal scholars have investigated the conceptualization of privacy (Solove,

6

2002; Solove, 2008; Westin, 2003) and examined it in connection with data security (Schwartz,
2013; Henry, 2015; Bambauer, 2013) and contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004). These
studies attempt to understand and define privacy within both the legal sense and in the
examination of human behavior. However, there are no studies that investigate whether fear
appeals, such as a terrorist threat, will make it more likely for people to allow governmental
access to communications that are generally considered private.
Privacy is not a term that can easily be defined. Various scholars have attempted to find
an all-encompassing definition for privacy. For example, it can be viewed as the right to control
interpersonal boundaries (Altman, 1976; Petronio, 2002), thoughts and reputation (Solove,
2002), and personal information (Gormley, 1992). Daniel Solove suggests that privacy can mean
the “solitude in one’s home” and “freedom from surveillance” (Solove, 2002, p. 1089). He also
argues that rather than trying to find a single comprehensive definition of privacy, scholars
should instead “explore what it means for something to be private contextually by looking at
particular practices” (Solove, 2002, p. 1093). Helen Nissenbaum (2004) also suggests that
privacy must be evaluated based on context. Her theory, contextual integrity, suggests that what,
how and when information is shared is critical in determining whether there has been a privacy
violation. Nissenbaum’s work focuses particularly on new communication technology because
using technology in a way that is not generally foreseeable by the public could lead to a
breakdown in contextual integrity, which could further lead to a privacy violation (Nissenbaum,
2004). Nissenbaum (2004) argues that public surveillance often results in a violation of
contextual integrity.
Privacy and surveillance are both important topics because online privacy is a significant
concern for people in the United States. A Pew Research Center study found that 50 percent of
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internet users are concerned about the degree to which their personal information is available
online (Rainie, 2013). Moreover, people are increasing their use of encryption to keep online
information safe. In a 2016 report, Bruce Schneier and his colleagues conducted a survey of
encryption products and found 865 of these products worldwide. The report indicated that the
United States produced the most products at 304, while Germany came in second at 112, and the
United Kingdom came in third at 54 (Schneier, Seidel, & Vijayakumar, 2016). In addition,
reactions to the PRISM program and to the FBI’s iPhone request make it clear that the violations
of privacy rights by the government are not welcome (Benner & Lichtblau, 2016; Selyukh &
Domonoske, 2016; Wikimedia v. NSA – Challenge to Upstream Surveillance, 2015). A 2016
Reuters’ poll indicated that “a majority of Americans do not want the government to have access
to their phone and Internet communication, even if it is done in the name of stopping terror
attacks” (Finkle, 2016). This study extends current research by going beyond an analysis of an
individual’s understanding of privacy and boundary construction, to examine the extent to which
fear appeals will lead to an acceptance of enhanced surveillance techniques.
Chapter 2 of this study is the Literature Review, which discusses privacy rights in the
United States and the theoretical conceptualization of privacy. Chapter 3 offers an examination
of the theoretical foundation for this study. Chapter 4 contains a thorough description of the
experimental method. Chapter 5 contains the experiment results. Chapter 6 provides a discussion
of the results and limitations, and Chapter 7 offers suggestions for future research and the
conclusion.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The focus of this study is fear appeals and willingness to allow increased governmental
surveillance. At the heart of governmental intrusion issues in the United States is privacy law.
When people in the United States pushed back against programs like PRISM and FBI access to
encrypted iPhone information they based their arguments on the constitutional right of privacy.
Thus, when discussing governmental intrusion and surveillance, it is important to recognize the
relationship between those issues and privacy.
This Literature Review is divided into two parts. The first part provides a historical
review of privacy rights in the United States, focusing on tort law and Fourth Amendment rights.
Part 1 also discusses the effect technology has had on privacy rights and data security. The
second part offers a review of the various theoretical conceptualizations of privacy.
Part 1: Privacy rights then and now
It is important to recognize that the word “privacy” is not expressly stated in the U.S.
Constitution. There is no section or amendment stating that U.S. citizens have a constitutional
right to privacy. Instead, the right to privacy has been inferred through the courts’ interpretations
of the Constitution. Privacy rights were initially proposed by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren
in a Harvard Law Review article in 1890 (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). When Warren and
Brandeis wrote their article, they were concerned about newspapers publishing private facts
(Warren & Brandeis, 1890). They believed that media were invading peoples’ personal lives and
proposed that “the protection of the person” should include the “right to be let alone” (Warren &
Brandeis, 1890, p. 198). They viewed privacy as a right that every individual inherently
possessed, allowing that person to control “to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, p. 198; Gormley, 1992). Warren
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and Brandeis urged the courts to recognize a cause of action for the invasion of privacy. Later,
after Brandeis became a Justice in the U.S. Supreme Court, he noted in his dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States (1928) that “the right to be let alone … [is] the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men” (Olmstead, p. 478). In Olmstead, the plaintiffs
alleged that the government violated their Fourth Amendment rights by wiretapping their private
telephones and using the conversations as evidence in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court found
that there was no violation of constitutional rights in that case.
Over time, the courts began to expand their decisions in order to recognize a right to
privacy. In fact, multiple privacy rights were formed as the result of the Warren and Brandeis
article (Gormley, 1992). These privacy rights include tort privacy, Fourth Amendment privacy,
privacy contained in state constitutions, First Amendment Privacy, and “Fundamental-Decision
Privacy” (Gormley, 1992, p. 2). This study focuses on two of those distinct privacy rights. The
first is tort privacy and the second is privacy against unreasonable governmental intrusion. These
two rights will be explained in detail below.
Tort Privacy
Not long after Brandeis and Warren published their article, the Supreme Court of Georgia
tentatively recognized a right of privacy in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. (1905). The
court stated that the right to privacy is “derived from natural law” and “guaranteed” through the
U.S. Constitution “in those provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty
except by due process of law” (Pavesich, 1905, p. 71). Nonetheless, the right to privacy did not
come into fruition overnight. Moreover, when it finally did take root, there was not a single
privacy tort definition (Prosser, 1960). Instead, through state common law and statutory law,
Brandeis and Warren’s proposed right evolved into four distinct torts: intrusion upon an
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individual’s solitude or private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing facts; placing an
individual in a false light; and appropriation of a person’s name or likeness (Prosser, 1960;
Gormley, 1992).
In 1960, William Prosser authored a law review article providing an in-depth overview of
the four privacy torts. Intrusion upon a person’s solitude involves physical intrusion (i.e. entering
someone’s home or eavesdropping) (Prosser, 1960). In order for there to be violation, there must
be an offensive or objectionable intrusion on a private matter (Prosser, 1960). According to
Prosser (1960), this particular tort was used to “fill in the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, and the
intentional infliction of mental distress” (Prosser, 1960, p. 392). Public disclosure of
embarrassing facts has three elements. There must be a (1) public disclosure of (2) private facts,
(3) the release of which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person (Prosser,
1960). For this tort, private facts would include information regarding sexual orientation,
financial condition, medical information and domestic problems (Trager, Russonmanno, Ross, &
Reynolds, 2013). The tort of false light involves the intentional or reckless public disclosure of
an alleged fact about an individual that is not actually true (Prosser, 1960). The information must
be highly offensive and something that a reasonable person would object to (Prosser, 1960). This
tort is closely related to defamation (Prosser, 1960). Finally, appropriation is the use of an
individual’s name or likeness without her consent and to the benefit of the person using the
likeness (Prosser, 1960). This tends to be the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s likeness without
monetary compensation. The interests protected through this tort is primarily proprietary in
nature (Prosser, 1960).
The majority of the four torts require the publication of private information or personal
likeness, which involves an affirmative action to make the information public through the use of
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communication. Intrusion is unique in that there does not need to be a publication. However,
because it involves an objectionable intrusion on a private matter (Prosser, 1960), there is still an
affirmative action taken to acquire the information.
Unlike the federal constitution, some state constitutions expressly recognize a general
right to privacy. This recognition, however, did not take place until the late 1960s and 1970s –
after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Katz (Gormley, 1992). Article 1, Section 1 of the
California Constitution provides that people have inalienable rights that include “obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.” Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana,
South Carolina and Washington also have constitutional provisions providing privacy protection.
In addition, many states have passed statutory laws bestowing privacy rights to individuals that
are sometimes broader than those afforded through common law.
Protection from governmental intrusion
Nearly forty years after Olmstead (1928), the U.S. Supreme Court held in Katz v. United
States (1967) that a privacy right in relation to governmental intrusion was included in the U.S.
Bill of Rights. Specifically, the Court indicated that privacy can be inferred from the language of
the Fourth Amendment, which states that people have the right to be “secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” (U.S. Const. amend. IV).
In Katz v. United States, the Court decided that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s
“privacy against … government intrusion” (Katz, 1967, p. 350).
Interestingly, it was the advent of new, more efficient and accessible technology that led
to the Court’s decision to recognize a Fourth Amendment right to privacy (Gormley, 1992). In
Katz, the FBI used an electronic device to listen in on and record Charles Katz’s telephone
conversation in a public telephone booth. Katz was using the phone to conduct illegal gambling
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activities, and, after listening in on his conversations, the government charged and convicted him
of violations to federal statutory law (Katz, 1967). Katz appealed his conviction and it
subsequently made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. In deciding the case, the Court found that
the government’s actions “violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied … and thus
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment” (Katz, 1967, p.
353). In addition, the Court offered further explanation regarding privacy rights. It found that the
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” (Katz, 1967, p. 351). Therefore, even if a
person is within the privacy of his own home there will be no Fourth Amendment protection if
he knowingly discloses private information to the public (Katz, 1967). On the other hand, “What
[a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected” (Katz, 1967, p. 351).
In his concurrence to Katz (1967), Justice Harlan proposed a two-prong privacy test that
courts continue to use today in cases concerning governmental intrusion. The test states that, in
order to have a privacy interest, an individual must show that: 1) he or she has an actual
expectation of privacy; and 2) society would recognize that expectation as reasonable (Katz v.
United States, 1967). Ten years later, in United States v. Chadwick (1977), the Court reiterated
that the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment is not limited to dwellings. Instead, it is
the individual who is protected from unreasonable governmental intrusion (Chadwick, 1977). In
Chadwick, the respondents were arrested by federal agents after they disembarked a train and
loaded their double-locked footlocker into the trunk of their car (Chadwick, 1977). The Court
found that the respondents had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the footlocker and that the
government needed a warrant in order to search it (Chadwick, 1977). In its decision, the Court
relied heavily on the privacy test proposed in Katz.
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Technology, new media and privacy
With the fast pace of technological advancements and the advent of the Internet and new
media, privacy rights continue to evolve. In a 2001 case, the Supreme Court found that if the
government conducts a search using a technological device that is not generally used by the
public, a warrant is required (Kyllo v. United States, 2001). In Kyllo (2001), the federal
government used a thermal imaging device to find out if Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in
his home. By using the device, the federal agents were able to detect the heat from the lamps
used to grow the plants without having to enter Mr. Kyllo’s home (Kyllo, 2001). The Court
found that using the thermal-detection technology constituted a Fourth Amendment search and
violated Kyllo’s rights. On the other hand, the use of technology to gather information is not
always a privacy violation, particularly when the information being sought by the government is
data, rather than the content of a communication. In Smith v. Maryland (1979), the police were
trying to catch a man who was placing harassing phone calls. The police asked the phone
company to install a pen register in order to record the phone numbers dialed by the man on his
home phone (Smith v. Maryland, 1979). Relying on Katz, the Supreme Court found that the use
of a pen register does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because people do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial (Smith v. Maryland, 1979). A critical
aspect of this case is that phone numbers, and not content from the actual phone calls, were being
recorded. It is also important to note that the Smith v. Maryland (1979) Court also found that a
person’s expectation of privacy in information can be extinguished when that information is
shared with a third party. In that case, the Court determined that when a person dials a phone
number, the person is voluntarily providing that information to the phone company in order to
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use the phone company’s services (Smith v. Maryland, 1979). Once that information is shared
with the phone company, the dialer can no longer control what the phone company does with
that information (Smith v. Maryland, 1979).
Courts have found that the use of eavesdropping technology without a warrant can be a
violation of the Fourth Amendment (Berger v. New York, 1967) and that people generally have
an expectation of privacy in their personal computer (U.S. v. Lifshitz, 2004; U.S. v. Buckner,
2007; U.S. v. Heckenkamp, 2007). Moreover, people also have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information contain on their cell phones. In Riley v. California (2014), Riley was
pulled over for a traffic stop and arrested for illegally carrying a weapon. At the time of his
arrests, the police seized and searched his cell phone (Riley v. California, 2014). The Supreme
Court determined that the police cannot search the cell phone of an arrested person without first
obtaining a warrant (Riley v. California, 2014). The Court likened cell phones to a miniature
computer, which can carry a significant amount of personal, private data about an individual
(Riley v. California, 2014).
The popularity of the Internet has led to additional privacy concerns. Social media sites
like Facebook collect personal information from users and then provide it to advertisers, which
results in personalized advertisements (Tucker, 2014). A survey conducted by the Pew Research
Center indicated that 57 percent of all American adults use Facebook (Smith, 2014). Moreover,
looking just at American adults who use the Internet, 73 percent of them use at least one type of
social networking site, and 71 percent of them use Facebook (Duggan & Smith, 2013). Facebook
recently expanded how it utilizes user data for advertisement purposes (Miners, 2014; Vara,
2014). This expansion has caused many to raise questions about privacy issues while using the
platform, with some arguing that this expansion significantly increases the intrusion on users’
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private information (Miners, 2014). Over the past few years, Facebook users have criticized the
company for its privacy policy and manipulation of newsfeeds (Farr & Oreskovic, 2014). The
company published an apology to its users in October 2014 for a secret experiment it conducted
in which it changed users’ news feeds to show them either low levels of positive or negative
posts in order to determine if the type of posts a person reads can affect that person’s emotional
state (Rushe, 2014). Moreover, there have been criticisms from users about Facebook’s privacy
options, and the media has been covering complaints about the platform’s privacy issues for
years (Sydell, 2012). Additionally, in November 2014, Facebook said that it had been receiving
increasing numbers of requests by various governments for user information (“Facebook says
government,” 2014).
There is some debate and scholarly research regarding whether social media sites like
Facebook are actually private (Burkell, Fortier, Wong, & Simpson, 2014). Courts have found
that, under some circumstances, the government can access Facebook posts without violating the
user’s constitutional privacy rights regardless of whether the user has privacy settings in place
(Palmieri v. United States, 2014; United States v. Meregildo, 2012). For example, multiple
federal courts have determined that “when a Facebook user allows ‘friends’ to view his
information, the government may access that information through an individual who is a ‘friend’
without violating the Fourth Amendment” (Palmieri v. United States, 2014, p. 11; United States
v. Meregildo, 2012). In Palmieri v. United States (2014), plaintiff Matthew Palmieri, who was a
former contractor for the United States, sued the government after his security clearance was
revoked following a federal investigation into his online activities. During its investigation, the
government accessed information contained in Palmieri’s Facebook account without his
permission (Palmieri, 2014). Specifically, Palmieri alleged that one of his Facebook “friends,”
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who had permission to access his wall, obtained information about him and shared it with federal
investigators. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the
government did not violate Palmieri’s constitutional rights because it was the Facebook friend
and not the government that initially accessed and shared the information (Palmieri, 2014).
Courts have also determined that although an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information contained in his or her computer, that expectation can be lost if the
individual shares the information with the public using a website (Palmieri v. United States,
2014; United States v. Meregildo, 2012). In the case of United States v. Meregildo (2012), the
court indicated that a Facebook user cannot expect his friends to keep the information on his wall
private and that he shared posts with his friends at his own peril. The court also found that when
a Facebook user posts information to the public, the user’s postings do not have Fourth
Amendment protection (Meregildo, 2012). However, somewhat confusingly, the court also stated
that “postings using more secure privacy settings reflect the user’s intent to preserve information
as private and may be constitutionally protected” (Meregildo, 2012, p. 525). This could illustrate
the courts’ inability or refusal to strictly define Facebook as private or public. Facebook and
other social media sites change their privacy and security settings often in order to deal with new
threats. As communication technology continues to evolve, it is likely that courts will be required
to determine how these changes affect privacy rights.
Privacy, governmental surveillance and terrorism
Law enforcement has often utilized surveillance and eavesdropping techniques in order
to gather intelligence concerning illegal activities in the United States. In the case of Berger v.
New York (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court found that the use of eavesdropping technology
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. In Berger (1967), the government argued that
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electronic interception of communications is necessary to combat organized crime. Similar
arguments have been made today regarding electronic surveillance to fight terrorism. For
example, at the beginning of the 2016 U.S. elections, then-presidential candidates Hillary Clinton
and Donald Trump called “for a beef-up for government surveillance programs in the wake of
terrorist attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California” (McCarthy, 2015). However, around
the same time, security experts were arguing that surveillance cannot stop terrorism (Brooks,
2015; Schneier, 2016).
Because technology evolves quickly and continuously, the nature of the relationship
between privacy and national security is dynamic and in a constant state of flux. With the advent
of smart phones and new media technology, the ability to communicate with others and store
data has advanced considerably. Along with these advances come new avenues for government
surveillance and fresh concerns about privacy. In addition, surveillance laws are repealed,
revised, or amended frequently, often due to concerns about privacy.
Though the government has used surveillance in the name of national security for a long
time, the significant changes came after September 11, 2001. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the
U.S. government began a more intense stance on surveillance and the use of surveillance to
combat terrorism. A little over a month after the attacks, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act.
Provisions of the PATRIOT Act provided the government with unprecedented power to use
surveillance to fight terrorism (Christensen, 2006). The Act categorized terrorism in a way that
allowed the government to investigate the suspicion of domestic terrorism offenses through the
use of wiretaps and searches of electronic communications (Christensen, 2006; Napolitano,
2013). The law made it easier for the government to obtain search and wiretap warrants
(Christensen, 2006; Napolitano, 2013). Around the same time, President Georgia W. Bush
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created the Terrorism Surveillance Program (codenamed “Stellar Wind”), which allowed the
NSA to unconstitutionally gather bulk telephone and internet data of U.S. citizens (Napolitano,
2013; Schneier, 2015). Information about Stellar Wind was leaked in 2004 by a former Justice
Department attorney (Schneier, 2015; Zetter, 2013). The program was supposedly ended in 2011
(Zetter, 2013); however, security experts such as Schneier suggest that the NSA did not stop
collecting email metadata, but rather, “just cancelled one particular program and changed the
legal authority under which they collected it” (Schneier, 2015). Schneier suggests that the FISA
Act of 2008 was a “replacement source for the data collection,” which authorized Internet
companies and service providers to give the government bulk data collected from the U.S. public
(Napolitano, 2013). The PRISM program, later leaked to the public by Edward Snowden, was
formulated from the authority of 2008 FISA amendments (Napolitano, 2013). Civil rights
organizations argued that Stellar Wind and PRISM violated U.S. citizens’ privacy rights
(Christensen, 2006; Napolitano, 2013). Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which granted the
government broad access to U.S. citizen’s communications was significantly restricted under the
USA Freedom Act, enacted in 2015 (Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). However,
Section 702, which enabled the PRISM project and Upstream surveillance, remained intact.
There are individuals in the government who argue surveillance is necessary in order to
protect the public from terrorism. In 2013, then National Security Agency Director, Keith
Alexander, told the House Intelligence Committee that PRISM helped to prevent approximately
50 terrorist activity plots (Nelson, 2013). Mike Rogers, the former chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, said in 2015 that the National Security Agency (NSA) needs to have
broad powers to monitor international phone calls in order to fight ISIS and stop terrorist
recruitment in the United States (Carroll, 2015). Hillary Clinton told Time in 2015 that
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monitoring of social media and increased surveillance were necessary to stop ISIS (Frizell,
2015).
Of course, when it comes to an increase in electronic surveillance, there is always a
question of whether someone’s privacy is violated. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in
Berger, that “The fantastic advances in the field of electronic communication constitute a great
danger to the privacy of the individual; …indiscriminate use of such devices in law enforcement
raises grave constitutional questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments” (p. 62, quoting
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
Civil liberties advocates argue that government surveillance infringes on U.S. citizen’s
privacy rights. In fact, the ACLU has filed multiple lawsuits, arguing that the authority provided
to intelligence agencies under the 2008 FISA amendments is too broad and allows for the illegal
searching of U.S. citizen’s private communications, such as ACLU v. Clapper (2015) and
Wikimedia v. NSA (2016). On November 17, 2016, the ACLU filed a third lawsuit against the
NSA, DOJ and CIA, alleging that the agencies are withholding important information from
American citizens and refusing to respond to Freedom of Information Requests (ACLU v. NSA,
2016). The suit suggests that Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 provides federal
intelligence agencies with the power to conduct warrantless surveillance on U.S. citizen’s
communications (ACLU v. NSA, 2016). Section 702 permits surveillance of people located
outside of the United States. However, the ACLU argues that the communications of Americans
who are in contact with foreigners could be accessed under the law (ACLU v. NSA, 2016). The
purpose of the section is to collect foreign intelligence information in order to keep the United
States safe from external threats. The ACLU alleges that the government uses the PRISM
surveillance program to access online communications such as email and social media through
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companies like Apple and Facebook (ACLU v. NSA, 2016). In addition, the organization claims
that the government uses Upstream surveillance to intercept telephone calls that go through large
communications companies such as AT&T and Verizon. Using these programs, the ACLU
argues that the government is able to conduct bulk searches of international online
communications (ACLU v. NSA, 2016). A particularly serious problem with Section 702
surveillance is that there is little judicial review and individual probable cause is not required
(ACLU v. NSA, 2016). According to the lawsuit, in 2015 the government needed only one court
order to gather communications related to 94,368 targets (ACLU v. NSA, 2016). The ACLU
argues that the U.S. public simply does not have the information necessary to understand how
Section 702 surveillance works and if the government is violating privacy rights (ACLU v. NSA,
2016). Those in the privacy and security field agree that the implications of Upstream
surveillance and retention of data are confusing (Eoyang, 2016). Mieke Eoyang, a privacy and
security researcher, offers a helpful explanation of Upstream surveillance. She indicates that
when a message is sent via email, it is broken down into various fragments called “packets”
(Eoyang, 2016, p. 4). These packets contain a mix of metadata, which is the information
regarding the communication, and content, the actual text of the communication (Eoyang, 2016).
The packets may then be sent all over the world before they arrive at their destination (Eoyang,
2016). For example, a message packet from Paris might be routed through serves in Virginia and
Georgia before arriving in Stockholm and being reassembled on the recipient’s device (Eoyang,
2016). Along the way, U.S. intelligence may be able to intercept the message when it is on U.S.
soil. Eoyang (2016) states:
For the U.S. intelligence community, the emergence of the global Internet was a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, it became difficult to distinguish between
domestic and International communications; parts of an e-mail exchange between
two people living in Atlanta travel through Cairo. On the other hand, the distributed
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design of the Internet provided easy access to foreign intelligence once huge
volumes of purely international communications began flowing through the United
States (p. 4).

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which is an independent,
bipartisan agency within the Executive Branch that works to ensure that the government’s
national security efforts do not violate U.S. citizens’ privacy and other civil rights, also has
concerns about government surveillance and the violation of privacy. In a 2016 report, the
PCLOB made it clear that Section 702 contains some cause of concern (Recommendations
Assessment Report, 2016). For example, though Section 702 surveillance targets foreign
individuals, the report states that the FBI, NSA and CIA are able to use Section 702 data to
gather information about U.S. citizens (Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). The
PCLOB recommended that the agency should be able to provide clear facts as to why
information involving a U.S. citizen is necessary and reasonably likely to help in efforts to
collect foreign intelligence (Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). The report suggests
that federal agencies are working to implement its recommendations but have not yet finished
(Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). The report further suggests that the NSA’s
Upstream collection technique does collect domestic communications and that the amount of
those communications could be substantial. (Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). The
PCLOB recommended that the government work to find technology that can better stop the
acquisition of domestic communications (Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). Though
the government has agreed to periodically assess its technology to ensure it is the best option
available, it has determined that nothing better is currently available (Recommendations
Assessment Report, 2016). The PCLOB is also concerned with “about” collection. “About”
communications are messages that are not from or to the government’s target but rather about

22

him or her (Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). These are communications between
non-targets, which the PCLOB believes can lead to privacy violations (Recommendations
Assessment Report, 2016). The PCLOB suggests that “about” collection “present[s] novel and
difficult issues regarding the balance between privacy and national security” (Recommendations
Assessment Report, 2016, p. 22). It recommended that the NSA develop technology that would
ensure the agency does not gather unnecessary information regarding non-targets
(Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016). The NSA has indicated that it currently uses the
best technology available but will periodically conduct studies to find out if better technology
exists (Recommendations Assessment Report, 2016).
Although civil rights groups show concern over surveillance and privacy issues, it is less
apparent whether individuals feel the same way. A 2015 Pew research study suggests that people
are willing to give up privacy for convenience (Rainie & Duggan, 2016; LaFrance, 2016). Many
of the 416 U.S. adults who took part in the study said they were willing to allow stores to track
them in order to access bargains through loyalty cards (Rainie & Duggan, 2016.) Even more
people said they were willing to allow their doctor to upload their medical history and records to
a website, so that they could have the benefit of being able to access their records as well (Rainie
& Duggan, 2016). However, the study also indicated that people were often resentful about what
happens to their information once they share it (Rainie & Duggan, 2016). A previous Pew study
also suggested that, though people in the United States complain about the erosion of privacy,
they are willing to take only small steps to protect their online data, and some of the respondents
seemed simply resigned to the idea that privacy is coming to an end (LaFrance, 2016). It appears
that although people say they are concerned about privacy, they are also willing to give it up in
exchange for a benefit.
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Privacy vs. Data Security
When examining the evolution of privacy in the digital age, it is important to evaluate the
boundaries of privacy. Specifically, one must consider where the security of data fits into the
puzzle. Brandeis and Warren realized long before the advent of the Internet that technology
could soon become a tool used to invade the rights of others (Warren & Brandeis, 1960). Over
time, the right to privacy has become such a broad topic that scholars have debated and proposed
various definitions to describe the true meaning of the word (Gormley, 1992). Many scholars
agree that the concept of privacy must evolve along with technology (Florek, 2013). Some have
used the terms “data security” and “information privacy” interchangeably, often arguing that
privacy and information security are one and the same (Kasdan, 2011; Mills, 2008; and
Schwartz, 2013). Still others argue that data security and information privacy are distinct
concepts with distinguishable objectives requiring separate statutory attention (Henry, 2015;
Bambauer, 2013). Some scholars on the latter side of the argument suggest that privacy focuses
on an individual’s decisions regarding who should receive permission to access personal
information, while data security, on the other hand, involves technological measures used to
regulate the access to private information (Bambauer, 2013).
Privacy and data security should be treated as distinct issues. If an individual decides to
share personal information with a company and the company then shares that information
without the individual’s permission there would be a breach of privacy (Bambauer, 2013). A data
security breach, on the other hand, would take place if the company unwittingly allowed a third
party access to the information through cyber theft (Bambauer, 2013). Some have further
suggested that a breach of privacy (e.g. a company’s purposeful release of an individual’s private
information) harms the individual while benefiting the company (Bambauer, 2013). On the other
hand, a breach of data security is harmful to both the individual and the company (Bambauer,
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2013). Privacy violations, with some limited exceptions, tend to involve the publication of
personal information without permission. However, data breach cases are about the failure to
adequately protect data. Moreover, privacy violations would require the company to take some
sort of action in furtherance of the breach. For example, intrusion upon an individual’s solitude
requires the act of intrusion and the publication of embarrassing facts requires the act of
publication. Data security is about a company’s omission or nonfeasance that subsequently leads
to the loss of information.
The harm in privacy cases is also different than that of a data security breach. The injury
in a privacy case includes harm to the victim’s feelings (Warren & Brandeis, 1908) and
reputation (Prosser, 1960) through the publication of personal information. Thus, it is the act of
publishing the private information or intruding on solitude (Prosser, 1960) and the subsequent
mental distress and suffering that are at the foundation of the right of privacy (Cantrell, 1974;
Prosser, 1960). The harm in a data breach case is more akin to a breach of fiduciary duty
(Solove, 2008). In other words, the injury that a victim experiences in a data breach case is not
the emotional harm that comes from the publication of private information. Rather, it is the
breach itself (i.e. the loss of information by the company) that is the harm (Solove, 2008). As
Daniel Solove (2008) indicated in his article regarding privacy on the Internet, “The virtue of the
breach of fiduciary duty approach is that this tort understands the breach to be the harm” (p.
122). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that companies that collect personal data should be
held to a fiduciary duty standard (Litman, 2000) because the release of the information without
permission would be a breach of confidentiality (Solve, 2008; Bambauer, 2013). This argument
has been made primarily in the context of the purposeful release of private information, which
would be an invasion of privacy issue (Litman, 2000). However, a similar argument could also
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be made in data breach cases where there is a theft of information rather than a purposeful
release. While duty of confidentiality may work for breach of privacy cases, the duty of care
would be more appropriate for data breach cases. In fact, Solove (2008) suggests that the ‘breach
of fiduciary duty approach” (p. 123) could be used in data breach cases.
Part 2: Conceptualization of privacy and its relationship to government surveillance
This study examines various conceptualizations of privacy, but does not attempt to
manufacture an all-encompassing definition of the word. Rather, this review of privacy research
provides an avenue to operationalize the understanding of the word for this specific study and
link privacy and surveillance.
As a result of Warren and Brandeis’s law review article, multiple privacy rights were
formed. The courts have interpreted privacy rights in the language contained in the First
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Ninth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, along with
tort law and the rights contained in statutory law and state constitutions (Gormley, 1992). At its
very basic foundation, Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word private as confidential
information that belongs to a person “as opposed to the public or the government” (Garner, 2006,
p. 563). Privacy law is defined as a “statute that protects a person’s right to be left alone or that
restricts public access to personal information” (Garner, 2006, p. 563). Various scholars have
attempted to define privacy, and though it may seem easy, as will be illustrated below, it is not.
Scholars suggest that the conceptualization of privacy goes much deeper than the
definition provided in Black’s Law Dictionary. For example, privacy involves the right to control
personal information (Gormley, 1992), interpersonal boundaries (Altman, 1976), and one’s body,
thoughts and reputation (Solove, 2002). It also involves “freedom from surveillance” and
“protection from searches and interrogations” (Solove, 2002, p. 2). Solove (2008) says the
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concept of privacy is so sweeping and in such disarray that no one can truly define what it
means. Indeed, as a concept, privacy can be viewed and examined multiple ways. For example, it
can be looked at from the angle of what types of practices people consider to be private (Solove,
2000), or it can be analyzed by the kinds of acts that invade the practices of others (Solove,
2006). Solove (2006) proposes that there are four groups of acts that can harm privacy: “(1)
information collection, (2) information processing, (3) information dissemination, and (4)
invasion” (p. 488). In addition, scholars have studied privacy both through its legal aspects and
as an analysis of human behavior (Solove, 2006; Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015).
Research regarding privacy and human behavior suggests that people may not truly
understand what privacy means or the consequences related to publishing private information
(Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015). Additionally, research suggests that people’s
concerns about privacy may be manipulated by others, such as commercial businesses and the
government (Acquisti et al., 2015). Behavioral economic research indicates that people take
many things into consideration when determining privacy boundaries such as the cost and
effectiveness of their action (Acquisti, & Grossklags, 2005). People may also underestimate the
risk of releasing private information or be influenced through psychological distortion, which
include problems with self-control and the need for immediate gratification (Acquisti, 2004).
Contextual integrity, a term and framework coined by Helen Nissenbaum (2004),
examines privacy by looking at how and why information flows from one person to the next or
from a person to another entity (Barth, Datta, Mitchell, & Nissenbaum, 2006). Contextual
integrity research proposes that decisions about privacy are based on the context and the specific
information being shared (Barth et al., 2006). The framework assumes that all functions of life
involve some sort of information flow (Nissenbaum, 2004). Moreover, there are certain norms
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regarding information flow that must be upheld (Nissenbaum, 2004). When those norms are
upheld, contextual integrity is maintained; however, a violation of those norms means a violation
of contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004).
Sandra Petronio (2002), who proposed the communication privacy management (CPM)
theory, suggests that people put boundaries around information that they want to be considered
private. The CPM theory, which is a dominate theory of privacy, is based on the idea that
individuals believe they have ownership of their personal information and that they have the
right to control who has access to that information (Petronio, 2002). People then use boundaries,
which can be controlled and regulated, to separate private information from their public
relationships (Petronio, 2002). According to the theory, individuals think they should have
control over their private information even after they grant access to the information to others
(Petronio, 2013). CPM “offers a privacy management system that identifies ways privacy
boundaries are coordinated between and among individuals” (Petronio, 2002, p. 3). Using an
example of a small group of friends, the theory indicates that one individual in the group could
decide to share private information with another person in the group (Petronio, 2013). Thus, the
first individual, or owner of the information, grants access to a co-owner (Petronio, 2013). The
owner could even grant access to multiple co-owners (Petronio, 2013). Then the owner would
negotiate boundaries with the co-owners to determine whether the information can be shared
with third-parties (Petronio, 2013). When formulating the foundation for the CPM theory,
Petronio (2002) proposed five basic beliefs: 1) private information; 2) boundaries that separate
private information and public relationships; 3) control; 4) a rule-based management system to aid in
boundary regulation; and 5) privacy and disclosure are treated as dialectic. Petronio (2002) believes
that these “[f]ive fundamental suppositions define the nature of CPM” (p. 3). Over time, the theory
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has evolved. In a CPM status report Petronio (2013) indicated that the theory has become more
streamlined over time. There are now three main elements that “represent the system of [CPM]”
(p. 8): 1) Privacy ownership; 2) privacy control; and 3) privacy turbulence.
What this review of privacy research illustrates is that pinning the term down with a
precise definition or theory is likely not possible. Instead, a better option may be to define
privacy based on what type of issue or problem one is examining (Solove, 2002). In the present
study, the issue being analyzed is surveillance, and as will be explained next, surveillance is a
type of privacy violation. Solove (2002) proposed that violations of privacy involve a disruption
of a person’s actions, traditions and decisions, such as communicating with others. According to
Solove (2002), surveillance, which is a way to collect information (Solove, 2006), is a type of
disruption. Solove (2002) suggested that “Being watched can destroy a person's peace of mind,
increase her self-consciousness and uneasiness to a debilitating degree, and can inhibit her daily
activities. We may want to protect against surveillance not merely to prevent disruptions of
certain practices but to foster practices or to structure society in a particular way (by restricting
the power of the government or employers)” (p. 22). Moreover, surveillance can be used as a
tool to control people’s behavior (Solove, 2006). In its appeal of the district court’s decision in
Wikimedia v. NSA (2015), the ACLU argued that the governmental surveillance allowed under
PRISM violated the privacy rights of Americans who communicate internationally (Wikimedia v.
NSA, 2016). They likened the surveillance to the government opening Americans’ mail and
reading the contents in search of illegal activity (Wikimedia v. NSA, 2016). The attorneys
suggested that privacy includes the ability to conduct communications without the concern of
warrantless governmental intrusion (Wikimedia v. NSA, 2016). Thus, at its very foundation,
surveillance is about privacy. The two concepts are interrelated in such a way that when
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considering issues of governmental surveillance in the United States, one must include an
examination of privacy interests and expectations.
Solove (2002) proposes that scholars should not attempt to conceptualize privacy by
trying to define it as “an abstract conception” (p. 21); instead, understanding privacy begins by
identifying “specific contextual situations” (p. 21). Rather than attempting to define all that
privacy is, this study conceptualizes it as “freedom from surveillance.” Thus, consent to allow
the surveillance of personal communications would be a decision to give up a degree of privacy.
When talking about privacy, and when people are willing to give it up, it is important to
also note the “privacy paradox.” The “privacy paradox refers to a discrepancy between an
individual’s attitude toward privacy and her behavior regarding privacy” (Acquisti, Brandimarte
& Loewenstein, 2015). In other words, people will say they have significant privacy concerns
regarding their personal information, yet they will share that information with a retail company
in order to receive the benefits of a loyalty card (Acquisti, Brandimarte & Loewenstein, 2015).
Studies of privacy and behavior economics may provide an answer to the paradox.
Acquisti (2004; Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005) indicates that people may not be able to
make rational decisions about privacy because of psychological distortions and an inability to
gather, and comprehend, all of the information necessary to make an informed decision. For
example, when deciding to share private information, an individual may not have the full
information about the related risks and technology that can keep information secure (Acquisti,
2004; Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005). Even if the individual did have all of the requisite
information, she may be limited by “bounded rationality” (Acquisti, 2004, p. 23; Acquisti &
Grossklags, 2005). Bounded rationality “refers to the inability to calculate and compare the
magnitudes of payoffs associated with various strategies the individual may choose in privacy-
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sensitive situations” (Acquisti, 2004, p. 23; Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005). Another issue could
be related to psychological distortions, such as hyperbolic discounting, which “implies
inconsistency of personal preferences over time – future events may be discounted at different
discount rates than near-term events (Acquisti, 2004). Hyperbolic discounting could lead to
taking few precautions in the present to ensure security in the future (Acquisit, 2004).
Acquisti (2004) suggests that immediate gratification, which is related to hyperbolic
discounting, could explain the privacy paradox. Acquisti (2004) uses the words of O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001, p.4) to explain immediate gratification. Basically, the term means that “A
person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date gets stronger as the
earlier date gets closer…People have self-control problems caused by a tendency to pursue
immediate gratification in a way that their ‘long-run selves’ do not appreciate” (Acquisti, 2004,
p. 24). The example Acquisti (2004) offers is quite simple. If, on Monday, a person was given
two options, she could either 1) work for 5 hours on Saturday or 2) 5 and a half hours on Sunday,
she would likely choose to work 5 hours on Saturday. However, if asked again on Friday, she
will be more likely to change her answer and decide to work 5 and half hours on Sunday
(Acquisti, 2004). As the time for her to work got closer, she was more likely to want to placate
her current self at the expense of her future self. When placed in the context of privacy, this
could mean that a person is more willing to share private information with others if there is a
current benefit, while not fully considering the risks or harm that could come to him in the
future. Acquisti (2004) further states that “when costs are immediate, time-inconsistent
individuals tend to procrastinate; when benefits are immediate, they tend to preoperate” (p. 26).
Thus, if the benefit of sharing private information comes before the cost/risk, it is likely
individuals will discount the future risk. This seems to help explain the privacy paradox. In
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addition, benefits do not have to be monetary or tangible. Some research suggests that the use of
social media, like Facebook, can create social capital, which is related with positive effects to
society such as increased health and lower crime rates (Ellison, Steinfeild & Lampe, 2007). If
social capital is a benefit that an individual knowingly or subconsciously seeks, this could
explain why people are willing to share intimate details on social media even while they tout the
importance of privacy.
Whether the issue of the privacy paradox stems from an inability to process privacy risks
or a time inconsistency that leads to immediate gratification and harm to the future self, there is
evidence that a privacy paradox exists. This is important because some scholars suggest that an
explanation for the paradox is so elusive because the paradox itself is illusory (Acquisti et al.,
2015). These scholars propose that attitudes, intentions and behaviors toward privacy should not
be expected to be related, so it is not paradoxical for a person with a high privacy concern to
share personal information (Acquisti et al., 2015). In other words, a person may believe that
privacy is important but that belief has no relationship with the person’s intention to share
personal information with a department store in exchange for benefits. However, Acquisti et al.
(2015) were not satisfied with that explanation because some studies have provided empirical
evidence that privacy attitudes, behaviors and intentions are related. Thus, there is evidence that
the privacy paradox is a supportable theory, and this current study examined whether the privacy
paradox exists when increased government surveillance of online activity is involved.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundation
This section discusses the theoretical foundation for the study. This study relies on
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) in order to investigate the relationship between fear
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and privacy. In addition, this study extends EPPM research by determining if there is a
relationship between cognitive dissonance and the rejection of a message that promotes
governmental access to private communications.
Extended Parallel Process Model
As illustrated in the Literature Review, there is a clear link between privacy and
government surveillance both legally and theoretically. This study focuses on the
conceptualization of privacy that highlights freedom from surveillance, and under the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. citizens have a right to privacy that prohibits
unreasonable governmental intrusion. As noted previously, courts have applied that right of
privacy to various types of communication including phones, computers, and social media. Thus,
under current law, the government cannot arbitrarily use surveillance to monitor the
communications of U.S. citizens. There is also a clear link between government surveillance and
national security, which was the reason the U.S. government began the PRISM project. The main
purpose of the program was to monitor for possible terrorist activity. The government argued
that by intercepting terrorist communication, it could stop threats against the United States and
its citizens. Privacy advocates argued that the PRISM program had the possibility of allowing the
government to monitor the communications of U.S. citizens without first obtaining a warrant;
thus, allowing for a breach of privacy. It is logical, however, to ask whether some individuals
may be willing to give up their constitutional right to privacy if it means keeping them safe from
the threat of terrorism. When considering the privacy paradox, it is logical that some will
willingly trade privacy for security, even if they have a high regard for privacy. Moreover, the
decision to give up privacy to increase security could stem from fear. Because EPPM examines
the effects of fear appeals, it is an appropriate theory to test the extent to which people are
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willing to waive their privacy rights because they are scared of terrorism. This section provides a
thorough explanation of EPPM’s assumptions and processes.
Researchers suggest that fear appeals can result in a cognitive process that drives an
individual to make attitude and behavioral changes based on the effects of the appeal (Witte,
1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). EPPM explains why fear appeals have persuasive
effects. The underlining assumption of the theory is that if a person feels fear, that person will
take some sort of action to alleviate the fear (Gass & Seiter, 2007). Furthermore, it assumes that
people process fear appeals both cognitively and emotionally (Witte, 1994). EPPM proposes that
when a person receives a message that contains a fear appeal, that person will begin to appraise
the message using two routes: danger control process and fear control process. Depending on
which route is dominant, the person has three possible options: no response, danger control or
fear control (Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). The process may then lead to
acceptance or rejection of the persuasive message (Witte, 1994). This theory, proposed by Kim
Witte (1994), melds together Leventhal’s parallel process model, which proposed the two
processing routes (i.e. fear control and danger control) and Roger’s protection motivation theory,
which focused on the danger control process (Witte, 1994). Fear “has been conceptualized as a
motivational state protecting one against danger” (Rogers, 1983, p. 155). Rogers (1983)
indicated that fear mediates attitude change. A fear appeal is operationalized as communication
that sets forth a threat that is then followed “with a recommended response to avert the threat”
(Witte, 1993, p. 147).
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Figure 1. The extended parallel process model (Maloney et al., 2011)
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In order to persuade the audience, the message attempts to elicit fear by illustrating a
threat, which could be portrayed by a danger that is relevant to the person in some way (Witte,
1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). The threat within the fear appeal contains two
elements: perceived severity and perceived susceptibility (Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, &
Witte, 2011). Perceived severity refers to the significance of the danger or threat, and perceived
susceptibility is related to whether the person thinks the threat represents an actual risk to him or
her (Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). The manipulation of the level of the threat
has been found to have an effect on the amount of fear people feel (Rogers, 1983).
The recommended response contained in the fear appeal, or efficacy, offers a route for
people to combat or overcome the threat through efficacy (Witte, 1993). Witte (1994) indicates
that efficacy has the ability to counteract fear. Thus, if the message recommends a response or
action in order to protect oneself from the threat, the person will evaluate that action using
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efficacy (Witte 1994). EPPM incorporates an examination of two kinds of efficacy: perceived
response efficacy and perceived self-efficacy (Witte, 1993; Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, &
Witte, 2011). Response efficacy examines how the person perceives the likelihood of the
action’s success, and self-efficacy refers to whether the person believes he or she is able to
conduct the recommended action (Witte, 1994).
EPPM proposes that once a person receives a message that contains a fear appeal two
appraisal processes will be initiated (Witte, 1994). First, the person will consider the degree of
threat (Witte, 1994). If there is no threat or if the threat is very minor, the person will not be
motivated to begin the second appraisal process (Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte,
2011). In that case, the person may take no response to the threat. However, if the perceived
danger of the threat is high, then the person is more likely to start the second process: The
efficacy assessment, where the person will consider whether the recommended action will fix the
threat and if the person can successful conduct the action (Witte, 1994).
If the message the person encounters does contain a significant threat, EPPM suggests
that the individual will have one of two possible reactions (Witte, 1997). The first is to become
scared and have an inability to act, which leads to defensive behaviors such as denying that a
threat exists (Witte, 1997). This reaction is called fear control. The second possible reaction is to
become motivated to understand the risk and work toward a solution or way to reduce the threat
(Witte, 1997). This reaction is called danger control. Thus, EPPM suggests that fear appeals lead
to two possible outcomes: danger control or fear control (Witte, 1997). The levels of perceived
efficacy have an effect on which process the individual will choose. (Witte, 1997).
According to EPPM, the danger control process will be initiated and the person will
accept the message’s recommendation and make changes to her attitude if the person perceives a
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high level of threat and has high efficacy (Witte, 1994; Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). For
example, Witte et al. (1998) found that participants who were exposed to a fear appeal message
that conveyed a high threat of genital warts transmitted through sexual intercourse and then
offered condom use as the high efficacy recommendation were more likely to have positive
attitudes toward condom used as compared to those exposed to a low efficacy recommendation.
According to Witte (1994) the danger control process, which is cognitive in nature, has four
components. First, the person perceives the threat and understands she is at risk. Second, the
person feels a high level of efficacy because she thinks she can take action to alleviate the risk.
Third, once that high level of efficacy is established, the person feels motivated to protect
herself. Finally, the person “deliberately and cognitively confronts the danger” (Witte, 1994, p.
115). This leads to an acceptance of the recommended response contained within the message
(Witte, 1997). This last stage, message acceptance, is where the person’s attitude may change in
order to alleviate the threat (Witte, 1997). When using the danger control process, people
become motivated to protect themselves (Witte, 1997). They recognize the threat and believe
that they can take action to prevent or overcome it (Witte 1997).
Witte (1994) further explains, however, that if a person perceives a high threat and has
low efficacy, then fear control process is initiated and the person will be on the defensive and
will likely reject the message recommendation (Witte, 1994). For example, Witte et al. (1998)
found that participants who were exposed to a message that conveyed a high threat of genital
warts and low efficacy of condom protection were less likely to have positive attitudes toward
condom use than those who were exposed to high efficacy. Witte (1994) explains that while
danger controls are cognitive in nature, fear controls tend to be part of an emotional response.
Danger controls lead the person to think about the threat and consider action to combat it, while
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fear controls are focused on how to handle the terror and stress the person feels in regard to the
threat (Witte, 1994). In order to control their fear, people will navigate toward defense
motivation, which means they will push the threat from their minds or will convince themselves
that the threat is not significant (Witte, 1994). This process leads to rejection of the message’s
recommendation (Witte, 1994).
The degree of threat controls the strength of the person’s rejection or acceptance of the
message recommendation, while the amount of efficacy controls whether the person decides to
use fear control or danger control (Witte, 1994). If the threat level is low, however, EPPM
suggests that there will be no relationship between efficacy level and message acceptance or
rejection (Witte, 1994). Thus, there are basically three possible outcomes to a fear appeal. First,
if a person does not perceive any sort of threat then there will be no response to the message at
all because the motivation to fully process the message and respond has not been initiated
(Roberto & Goodall, 2009). Second, if the person perceives a serious threat and has no way to
combat the threat (i.e little or no efficacy) that person will gravitate toward the fear control
process (Roberto & Goodall, 2009). Finally, if the person perceives a high threat and believes
that he or she can act to alleviate the threat (perceived high efficacy) that individual will choose
the danger control process (Roberto & Goodall, 2009). According to EPPM scholars, if a
company, such as a health organization, wants to persuade people to make better lifestyle
choices, it will use messages that contain a fear appeal with high efficacy in order to steer people
toward the danger control process, which includes accepting the message’s recommendation and
making attitude and behavioral changes (McMahan, Witte, & Meyer, 2009; Smith, Rosenman,
Kotowski, Glazer, McFeters, Keesecker, & Law, 2008).
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Witte, Berkowitz, Cameron and McKeon (1998) indicate that EPPM is a “health risk
message theory” (p. 572), and much of the previous research using the theory has focused on
health communications. Using EPPM, Witte has investigated the effectiveness of health
campaigns (Witte & Allen, 2000). Specifically, she has used the theory to examine messages
about teenage pregnancy (Witte, 1997), preventing the spread of AIDS (Witte, 1994) and genital
warts (Witte, Berkowitz, Cameron & McKeon, 1998), as well as the health risks of exposure to
electromagnetic fields (McMahan, Witte, & Meyer, 2009). Similarly, other recent EPPM
research has primarily analyzed health communications including messages regarding: kidney
disease (Roberto & Goodall, 2009); substance abuse (Choi, Krieger, & Hecht, 2013); bed bugs
(Goodall & Reed, 2013); hearing loss (Smith et al., 2008); meningitis (Gore & Bracken, 2005);
healthy eating (Napper, Harris, & Klein, W. M. (2014); melanoma (Shi & Smith, 2016); HPV
(Carcioppolo, Jensen, Wilson, Collins, Carrion, & Linnemeier, 2013); and general health news
(Hong, 2011). Moreover, EPPM has generally been used by scholars to analyze messages that
are intended to persuade.
Although EPPM research is primarily health-related, it is logical that the theory can
explain attitude changes due to non-health threats. In this study, it will be used to explain attitude
changes regarding the right to privacy when a person is faced with the threat of terrorism.
Moreover, the fear appeal used in this study will be formatted to read like a news article. Recent
research suggests that the theory can be used to study news articles, which are not expressly
meant to persuade but have an incidental persuasive or influential effect (Goodall & Reed, 2013;
Hong, 2011). These types of messages, though non-persuasive in nature, have the ability to illicit
fear. Hyehyun Hong (2011) conducted a study using EPPM to examine how audiences process
the information conveyed in television news stories about health threats. In the study, Hong
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(2011) assumed that health stories broadcast by TV news contain fear appeals because they
present health risks and then offer recommendations to avert the risks. Hong (2011) discovered
that some of the EPPM variables (perceived threat severity, response efficacy and self-efficacy)
mediated the amount of influence health consciousness had on message acceptance. Goodall and
Reed (2013) extended EPPM research by investigating news coverage regarding bed bugs. One
focus of the study was to test the use of EPPM in messages that were non-persuasive (2013).
Similar to Hong, Goodall and Reed (2013) suggested that health news stories likely contain fear
appeals because they provide information about a health threat and then offer recommendation in
living a healthy lifestyle. The Goodall and Reed (2013) study had an additional importance in
that it researched an uncertain threat. Goodall and Reed (2013) suggested that the public was
uncertain about the threat of bed bugs and how to stop them from spreading. Yet, the researchers
also found that the public had fear regarding infestations (Goodall & Reed, 2013). The study
asked whether uncertainty about the threat and efficacy have an effect on whether individuals
sought more information about bed begs or practiced message avoidance. The results indicated
that uncertainty as to a threat tended to cause people to seek out more information about bed
bugs, while uncertainty about efficacy resulted in issue avoidance (Goodall & Reed, 2013).
This current study extends previous EPPM research. Studies using EPPM tend to test the
theory on a variety of health topics, which focus on threats to an individual’s wellbeing from a
variety of conditions, ailments and infectious diseases. This study investigates to what extent
EPPM’s assumptions hold true in the context of the threat of terrorism. In this case, the fear
appeal will be the danger of terrorist activity and the efficacy (i.e. the message containing the
recommendation for action) will be the willingness to allow increased government surveillance.
In other words, if people accept the efficacy recommendation and agree that increased
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governmental monitoring of communications should be used to combat terrorism, they are also
consenting to waive their right to privacy. As noted previously, breach of privacy is about the
disruption of a person’s actions, such as communication, and surveillance is one such type of
disruption (Solove, 2002). Under the Fourth Amendment, the government cannot arbitrarily
monitor the communications of all U.S. citizens. However, people have the ability to waive their
privacy rights. This study investigates whether people will waive those rights when they are
scared. Thus, the following hypotheses will be tested:
H1a: Those exposed to the high threat/high efficacy government surveillance fear appeal
will have a higher message acceptance rate than those exposed to the high threat/low
efficacy government surveillance fear appeal.
H1b: Those exposed to the high threat/high efficacy individual reporting fear appeal
will have a higher message acceptance rate than those exposed to the high threat/low
efficacy individual reporting fear appeal.
Message acceptance is more likely to occur when the person is exposed to a high threat/high
efficacy recommendation (Witte, 1994; Witte et al., 1998). Thus, participants who are exposed to
a high threat of terrorism and a high efficacy option of either increased government surveillance
or individual reporting will be more likely to accept those efficacy messages. In other words, this
suggests that individuals who are exposed to the high threat and high government surveillance
efficacy option will be more willing to waive their privacy rights by consenting to increased
surveillance.
This study also investigates whether the relationship between level of efficacy and
message acceptance remains depending on the type of high efficacy offered. This study tests two
efficacy options: 1) increased governmental surveillance and 2) relying on individual reporting
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of suspicious activity to law enforcement. The aftermath of the PRISM scandal has made it clear
that the right to privacy is important to many people in the United States. Indeed, the ACLU filed
a lawsuit against the NSA arguing that the type of surveillance used by the PRISM program
violated Americans’ privacy rights (Wikimedia v. NSA, 2016). Moreover, the right of privacy
came up again more recently when the FBI attempted to gain access to the iPhone used by one of
the San Bernardino attackers (Benner & Lichtblau, 2016; Selyukh & Domonoske, 2016). There
is no question that the courts have inferred a right to privacy within the Fourth Amendment
because it is a critical part of the country’s foundation. Thus, it is possible that people will be
more willing to accept an efficacy recommendation that involves individual reporting than one
that calls for increased government monitoring of communications. This study will test the
following:
RQ1: Is there a significant difference between the message acceptance rate of those who
were exposed to the government surveillance efficacy option as compared to those
exposed to the individual reporting efficacy option?
H2a: Those exposed to the government surveillance high threat/high efficacy option will
have more favorable attitudes toward government surveillance than those who were
not.
H2b: Of participants who have a greater level of privacy concern, those who are exposed
to the increased surveillance high efficacy option will have more favorable attitudes
toward government surveillance than those who are exposed to the other efficacy
options.
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H2c: There will be a positive relationship between the perceived threat of terrorism and
attitudes toward government surveillance.
EPPM tests whether a fear appeal can persuade an individual to accept a recommendation
for action (Witte, 1994). In this case, those who are exposed to the government surveillance high
efficacy recommendation will likely be persuaded by the fear appeal to accept that
recommendation. However, those who are exposed to a different efficacy option will not have
the opportunity to be persuaded by that particular message and will likely have more negative
opinions about government surveillance. These questions are important because they not only
examine the extent to which people will accept government surveillance as compared to
individual report, they also investigate a concept that has not yet been studied by researchers.
Scholars using EPPM have examined why efficacy has an effect on persuasion (Witte, 1994),
threat-to-efficacy ratios (Carcioppolo et al., 2013), and how different types of efficacy are related
(Choi, Krieger, & Hecht, 2013). However, none of the studies have investigated how opinions
regarding efficacy can affect persuasion. For example, Witte (1994) indicates that if a person
perceives a threat and believes that she has efficacy to combat the risk, she will navigate toward
the danger control process and message acceptance. However, would the result be the same if the
person is provided with a high, yet undesirable, efficacy option? For example, if a person
considers terrorism as a threat and believes that increased government surveillance is a viable
option, will the individual be less likely to accept that option if he or she has a higher concern for
privacy? As noted previously, studies indicate that U.S. citizens tend to value privacy, though
they will give it up for certain benefits. This study uses EPPM in order to discover whether fear
appeals regarding terrorism could persuade individuals to have favorable attitudes toward
increased government surveillance.
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This study also considers the privacy paradox. Thus, this study also tests the following:
RQ2: Is there a negative association between privacy concerns and attitudes toward
government surveillance?
H3a: In the government surveillance groups, privacy and fear control will have a positive
correlation.
H3b: In the individual reporting group, privacy and fear control will have a positive
correlation.
Logic will tell us that there should be an association between privacy and attitudes toward
government surveillance. If studies show that people in the United States covet privacy and
governmental surveillance is an invasion of privacy, then people with high privacy rates should
have more negative attitudes toward government surveillance. This should also mean that as the
need for privacy increases, the rejection of the government surveillance message should also
increase. However, the privacy paradox suggests the opposite is true. Even though people want
privacy, they will willingly give it up for a benefit (Acquisti, Brandimarte & Loewenstein, 2015).
In this case, the benefit is safety from terrorism, both nationally and individually.
Cognitive Dissonance
This study extends EPPM research by examining if there is a relationship between
cognitive dissonance, message rejection and message acceptance. In addition, this study also
advances privacy research by investigating to what extent dissonance is associated with privacy
concerns. This section provides a review of cognitive dissonance.
Cognitive dissonance refers to inconsistencies between an individual’s beliefs and
actions. The theory proposes that if an individual has an inconsistency in her beliefs and
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behaviors it can lead to discomfort (Festinger, 1962). According to the theory, the individual will
want to alleviate the discomfort and will do that by reducing the dissonance in order to “achieve
consonance” (Festinger, 1962, p. 3). In other words, if an individual is dealing with an
inconsistency between what she believes and how she acts, there must be some sort of change in
order to bring her beliefs and actions back into harmony. Festinger (1962) uses the word
“dissonance” to replace inconsistency and the word “consonance” to replace consistency. In
addition to attempting to bring beliefs and actions back into harmony, the theory also proposes
that individuals will avoid situations that could increase the inconsistency (Festinger, 1962).
Festinger (1962) explains that cognitive dissonance is a motivating factor parallel to the feelings
of hunger. If an individual is hungry, she looks for food (a way to alleviate the hunger).
Cognitive dissonance is similar in that it causes an uncomfortable feeling that leads an individual
to seek ways to alleviate the discomfort (Festinger, 1962; Kenworthy, Miller, Collins, Read &
Earleywine, 2011). Moreover, research suggests that cognitive consistency is a primary
motivational factor for people in general (Gawronski, 2012).
Once an individual is faced with an inconsistency, there are multiple avenues to reduce
the dissonance. One way could be a change in behavior, and another way could be a change in
knowledge or attitude toward a certain behavior, this could involve acquiring new knowledge
(Festinger, 1962). Festinger (1962) used smoking as an example of cognitive dissonance. A
smoker could believe that smoking is harmful for her health, yet she continues to smoke anyway
(Festinger 1962). In that case, there is an inconsistency between that smoker’s beliefs and her
actions. The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that the smoker will want to alleviate the
discomfort of that inconsistency in some way. The smoker could attempt to reduce the
dissonance by changing her actions – in other words, she can stop smoking (Festinger, 1962).
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That would bring harmony back to her actions and beliefs. Another option would be to change
her attitude by rationalizing her decision to keep smoking perhaps by convincing herself that the
benefits of smoking outweigh the risk (Festinger, 1962; Kleinjan, van den Eijnden & Engels,
2009). For example, studies indicate that people who are able to justify smoking are less likely to
quit the habit (Kleinjan et al., 2006). In other cases, dissonance can be persistent and may never
truly end (Festinger, 1962). Even so, Festinger (1962) proposes that the individual will continue
her efforts to reduce the dissonance.
This study extends cognitive dissonance research by examining whether dissonance is
associated with the acceptance or rejection of a fear appeal recommendation. In particular, this
study focuses on individuals’ attitudes toward the efficacy options provided through the fear
appeal. Cognitive dissonance suggests that when people are exposed to beliefs that are opposed
to their own, an inconsistency will occur. Thus, it is likely that if a person has a positive attitude
toward privacy and limited governmental intrusion, dissonance will result from a high efficacy
option that involves increased governmental surveillance. Along the same vein, the person will
likely feel less dissonance when faced with a high efficacy option that includes individual
reporting of suspicious activity. What is unclear is how cognitive dissonance will affect the rates
of message rejection and acceptance. The study by Hong (2011) found that an outside variable,
health consciousness, was associated with threat severity, threat susceptibility, response efficacy
and self-efficacy. Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 2, the current study examines to what extent
cognitive dissonance affects threat and efficacy. Moreover, because the message involves
consent to allow increased government surveillance, this study investigates in what way
dissonance is associated with the decision to accept a message that promotes government
monitoring of private communications.
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Figure 2: Relationship between cognitive dissonance and fear control (Hong, 2011)
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Figure 3: Relationship between cognitive dissonance and danger control (Hong, 2011)
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Thus, this study investigates the following research questions:
RQ3a: Is there a significant relationship between level of dissonance and perceived threat
severity?
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RQ3b: Is there a significant relationship between level of dissonance and perceived threat
susceptibility?
RQ3c: Is there a significant relationship between level of dissonance and fear?

Hong (2011) discovered that an outside variable, health consciousness, was positively
associated with perceived severity of the threat. Similarly, it is likely that those who feel a
greater dissonance when reading the threat will perceive a higher severity and susceptibility in
the threat. Because fear leads to fear control and message rejection, it is also likely that
dissonance could be associated to fear.
RQ4a: Is there a significant relationship between level of dissonance and response
efficacy?
RQ4b: Is there a significant relationship between level of dissonance and self-efficacy?
Hong (2011) found that there was a positive relationship between health consciousness
and both types of efficacy. According to Festinger (1962), dissonance causes a person
discomfort, which he or she will want to alleviate through changes in action or attitude. In this
case, if the participants feel uncomfortable about the threat of terrorism, it makes sense that they
will want to use efficacy to alleviate the threat.
RQ5a: Is there a significant relationship between level of dissonance and fear control?
RQ5b: Is there a significant relationship between level of dissonance and danger control?
RQ5c: When controlling for fear, perceived threat and perceived efficacy, can cognitive
dissonance predict a significant amount of variance in fear control?
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RQ5d: When controlling for fear, perceived threat and perceived efficacy, can cognitive
dissonance predict a significant amount of variance in danger control?
Hong (2011) also found that there was a direct relationship between health consciousness
and message acceptance. It is likely that an outside variable like dissonance will also have an
effect on message acceptance (danger control) and message rejection (fear control). In order to
determine that relationship is not spurious, it is also important to test the association after
controlling for the EPPM variables.
H5a: When isolating the participants in the government surveillance efficacy groups,
privacy will have a positive association with dissonance.
H5b: When isolating participants in the government surveillance efficacy groups, there will
be a negative relationship between the levels of dissonance and attitude toward government
surveillance.
As noted previously, there is a link between privacy and government surveillance
(Solove, 2002). In cases of the government using electronic devices to intercept communications,
there are often questions surrounding privacy. Logically, those who highly covet privacy will be
less likely to approve of government surveillance (though the privacy paradox calls that into
question). Moreover, people feel dissonance when they are “forced to advocate for a position
they disagree with” (Metzger et al., 2015, p. 13). Even viewing information that advocates for an
ideology that the individual opposes can lead to dissonance (Metzger et al., 2015) Thus, those
who are concerned about privacy will likely feel more dissonance when they read a message that
advocates the use of increased government surveillance to combat terrorism. It is also likely that
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those who are concerned about privacy will be less likely to approve of government surveillance
as compared to those who are not as worried about privacy.
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Chapter 4: Method
The data for this study was collected using an online experiment to test EPPM on a nonhealth issue (terrorism) and examine the effects of cognitive dissonance on message acceptance.
The experiment employed a 2 (severity of threat: high/low) x 4 (efficacy: low/high governmental
surveillance; low/high individual reporting), along with a control group that received a generic
message that had no relation to terrorism or government surveillance. There was a total of nine
groups, with 40 people per group.
Participants and procedure
The 360 participants were recruited using a Qualtrics panel. Qualtrics has a pool of more
than a million people who have previously agreed to take part in a variety of surveys. These
panelists join from a variety of sources such as airline customers who chose to join in a reward
program for sky miles, retail customers who opt in to get points at a retail outlet or general
consumers who participate for cash. Qualtrics randomly invited people from its current pool to
participate in this experiment. The participants were rewarded based on their previous individual
agreements with Qualtrics. Qualtrics determines the incentive based on each individual
participant's profile data when they enroll to take part in Qualtrics surveys. Some people received
monetary compensation, while others received rewards points or sky miles. The participants
recruited for this experiment were U.S. citizens, 18 years or older. This study focuses on U.S.
citizens for two reasons. The first is that the privacy rights (i.e., freedom of governmental
intrusion) emphasized in this study are based on the U.S. Constitution. Second, for the reasons
laid out in the next section, fear appeals should be directed toward a certain audience. In this
case, it makes sense to have the audience be people located within the United States. The
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participants were instructed to access an online Qualtrics survey. The unit of analysis for this
study is individuals.
Initially, each participant was sent an email from Qualtrics inviting them to take part in
the experiment. Once they agreed to take part, they were automatically and randomly placed into
one of the one of the eight experimental groups or the control group. In order to avoid priming
the participants, a pre-test questionnaire was not conducted. Each participant read one article
containing one of the manipulation pairs. For example, one group read an article that contained a
high threat of terrorism and a high efficacy of increased government surveillance. A second
group read an article that contain high threat of terrorism and a low efficacy of increased
government surveillance, and so on. The control group read an article that was not related to
terrorism or government surveillance. There was a total of nine articles. Each article was
produced as if it was written and published by CNN. The articles were all of similar length with
the longest being 489 words and the shortest being 466 words (see Figures 1 and 2). After
reading the article, the participants were asked to answer a variety of questions pertaining to the
variables explained later in this section.
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Figure 4. Example stimulus
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Figure 5. Example Stimulus.

The fear appeal message
This study furthers privacy research by using EPPM to determine to what extent
participants are willing to waive privacy rights and allow for increased government surveillance.
In furtherance of that goal, this study tests EPPM in relation to the threat of terrorism, compares
two high efficacy options to determine if there are significant differences, and examines the
effect of cognitive dissonance on threat, efficacy and privacy concern. As noted previously, each
article was manipulated based on threat level and type of efficacy. For example, some of the
articles contained an efficacy message that advocated for increased government surveillance of
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phone and Internet communications in order to combat terrorism. Other articles contained an
efficacy message that advocated for relying on individual reporting of suspicious activity to law
enforcement to fight terrorism (see Table 1). Articles using specific combinations of independent
variables (i.e. high threat/low efficacy; high threat/high efficacy increased governmental
surveillance; and high threat/high efficacy individual reporting) were randomly assigned to each
experimental group.
Table 1. Experimental Groups
Group

Topic

High/Low Threat

High/Low Efficacy

Group 1

Government Surveillance

High Threat

High Efficacy

Group 2

Government Surveillance

High Threat

Low Efficacy

Group 3

Individual Reporting

High Threat

High Efficacy

Group 4

Individual Reporting

High Threat

Low Efficacy

Group 5

Government Surveillance

Low Threat

High Efficacy

Group 6

Government Surveillance

Low Threat

Low Efficacy

Group 7

Individual Reporting

Low Threat

High Efficacy

Group 8

Individual Reporting

Low Threat

Low Efficacy

Group 9

Control Group

NA

NA

Witte (1993; Witte et al., 1998) published instructions regarding what elements are
necessary for a good fear appeal. While other scholars have relied on Witte’s (1993; Witte et al.,
1998) recommendations when crafting fear appeals for similar studies (Goodall & Reed, 2013;
McMahan, Witte & Meyer, 1998; Morman, 2000; Muthusamy, Levine & Weber, 2009; Roskos‐
Ewoldsen, Yu & Rhodes, 2004; Smith et al., 2008, and Witte & Allen, 2000), their research does
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not offer the same level of detailed instruction about the specific fear appeal elements. Thus, the
fear appeal in this study was structured as per Witte’s (1993; Witte et al., 1998) specific
recommendations. Witte (1993; Witte et al., 1998) suggests that fear appeals need to be created
systematically. Fear appeals must contain certain “(a) structural, (b) stylistic, and (c) extramessage features” (Witte, 1993, p. 147; Witte et al., 1998). When it comes to structure, the fear
appeal must present both a threat and a recommended avenue to minimize or prevent the threat
(efficacy) (Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998). The threat portion of the message must address both
severity and susceptibility (Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998). The efficacy portion needs to include
response efficacy and self-efficacy (Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998). Finally, extra-message
relates to features that might be able to influence the reader but are not explicitly part of the
message such as source credibility (Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998). Witte (1993; Witte et al.,
1998) proposed four procedures to develop an ideal fear appeal. First, when creating each
component of the fear appeal (i.e. threat severity, threat susceptibility, self-efficacy, and response
efficacy), the researcher must craft the language in order to address the particular audience
(Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998). Second, the different fear appeal levels need to be manipulated
through the substantive language (Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998). Thus, language that is meant
to convey a high fear appeal will emphasize how severe the threat is, be “vivid and intense,” and
focus on the susceptibility of the reader (Witte, 1993, p. 148; Witte et al., 1998). Conversely, low
fear appears will use neutral language and be vague about the risk to the audience (Witte, 1993;
Witte et al., 1998). Third, the different levels of fear appeals need to be comparable (Witte, 1993;
Witte et al., 1998). In other words, the sources, accuracy and complexity must be the same
(Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998). Fourth, the message needs to be targeted to the correct audience
and the efficacy options need to correspond with the variables being tested (Witte, 1993; Witte et
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al., 1998). This means that if the efficacy calls for specific action from the reader then the
variables being measured need to also address specific action (Witte, 1993; Witte et al., 1998).
Witte (1993; Witte et al., 1998) suggests using a single-message design when studying fear
appeals.
Following Witte’s (1993; Witte et al., 1998) instruction, a high-threat fear appeal
message was developed pertaining to terrorism. The message focused on a general, American
adult audience’s susceptibility to terrorism and the severity or risk of it. The messaged focused
on the possibility of a terrorist attack in the United States and used vivid language to describe the
severity of terrorism. The low threat message focused on the eradication of ISIS. Both messages
were crafted using actual CNN articles as the base message (see Appendix B). The headlines and
headings in both messages came from actual news sources. A professional journalist reviewed
and edited the articles to ensure journalistic style and formatting.
The government surveillance high efficacy message focused on ways that surveillance
can help root out and prevent terrorist activities. The language was taken from actual news
stories and the NSA’s website. The low efficacy message contained information that suggests
government surveillance cannot stop terrorist attacks. The language and information were taken
from real studies and news stories. The individual reporting high efficacy message focused on
the effectiveness of individual reporting of suspicious activity in order to stop terrorism. The
language was taken from news articles and the FBI’s website. The low efficacy option contained
information suggesting that reporting suspicious activity to authorities does not stop terrorist
attacks. This language was again taken from real news stories. All of the stimulus articles are
provided in Appendix B.
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Measures
The EPPM variables were measured using closed-ended questions adapted from
measures used in previous research by Witte (2000). According to Witte’s (1992; Witte, 2000)
research, perceived threat, efficacy, danger control and fear control are made up of multiple
components, which are combined to create scales. In this study, the internal reliability of the
scale was measured using Cronbach’s alpha. An alpha greater than .70 represents acceptable
reliability, and a result greater than .80 represents strong reliability.
Perceived threat. The items used to measure threat were gathered from previous research by
Witte, et al. (1996; Witte, 1994; Witte et al., 1998; McMahan, Witte and Meyer, 1998).
Perceived threat includes two components: susceptibility and severity. As suggested by Witte, et
al. (1996; Witte et al., 1998), three items were used to measure each component. The items were
measured using a 7-point-Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree). All six items
were averaged in order to create a scale (α = .82) (See Table 2).
Perceived efficacy. There are two components to efficacy: self-efficacy and response efficacy.
The items used to measure these components were measured using a 7-point-Likert scale
(1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree). As suggested by Witte (2000; Witte, et al., 1996;
Witte et al., 1998), three items were used to measure each type of efficacy (see Table 1). All of
the items were averaged in order to create an efficacy scale. Because there were two separate
efficacies that were tested in this study (increased government surveillance and individual reporting of
suspicious activity), two distinct scales were calculated: Government surveillance efficacy (α = .93) and
individual reporting efficacy (α = .89).

Danger control/Message Acceptance. The danger control variable (or message acceptance)
consists of two variables: attitudes and intentions. Attitudes toward the two efficacy options
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were measured using Witte (2000; Witte, 1994; Witte et al., 1996; Witte et al., 1998) procedure,
which uses semantic differential scales. In this study, attitudes toward governmental surveillance
(α = .95) and individual reporting were measured using six semantic differential scales that were
combined to create two separate scales (see Table 2). Intent was measured using three items that
asked participants about their future intentions regarding the efficacy options (see Table 2). The
items were measured using a 7-point-Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree). The
items were averaged to create two new scales: Intent (individual reporting) (α = .88) and Intent
(government surveillance) (α = .87)

Fear control/Message Rejection. Fear control, which is made up of three components, was
measured using items developed by Witte (2000; Witte, 1994; Witte et al., 1996; Witte et al.,
1998). The three components are: Defensive avoidance, message minimization and message
manipulation.
Defensive avoidance was measured by asking participants to respond to three items
pertaining to terrorism, which were measured using 7-point Likert scales (see Table 2). The
items were averaged in order to create an avoidance scale (α = .90).
Message minimization examines reactance (Witte, 2000, Witte, 1994; Witte et at., 1998).
In other words, it measures how much an individual minimizes the message contained in the fear
appeal. Message minimization was measured by asking participants to rate adjectives on a 7point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) (see Table 2). The items were
averaged in order to create a minimization scale (α = .96).
Perceived manipulation was measured by asking participants to rate adjectives pertaining
to how they felt about the article they read (see Table 2). The items were measured on a 7-point
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Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) and were averaged to in order to create a
manipulation scale (α = .94).
Fear. The final EPPM variable is fear, which was measured by having the participants rate
adjectives that describe how frightened or uncomfortable they felt after reading the article (Witte,
2000; Witte, 1994) (see Table 2). The items were measured using a 7-point-Likert scale (1=not at
all to 7=very much) and then averaged in order to create a fear scale (α = .95).
In addition to testing the EPPM variables, this study sought to discover if cognitive dissonance
was associated with message rejection and if there is a relationship between acceptance of
increased government surveillance and privacy concern. Thus the following variables were
created.
Cognitive dissonance. Metzger, Hartsell and Flanagin (2015) determined that previous cognitive
dissonance studies assumed dissonance was present but did not actually measure for it, so they
developed a new scale to specifically measure participants’ cognitive dissonance. This current
study used items adapted from the Metzger et al. (2015) study. Nine items, each measured using
a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree), were used to
measure dissonance. However, one item was subsequently removed due to reliability concerns
(see Table 2). With that item included, the reliability alpha was .77; however, after removing that
item, the alpha increased to .79. The eight items, shown in Table 1, were averaged in order to
create a dissonance scale.
Privacy concern. The items used to measure privacy attitude were gathered from previous
research by Buchanan, Paine, Joinson, and Reips (2007). Buchanan et al. (2007) developed three
scales to measure people’s behaviors and attitudes toward privacy. Two of the scales were
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behavioral in nature: general caution scale and technical protection scale (Buchanan et al., 2007).
The third scale, called the privacy concern, measured people’s attitudes. The privacy concern
scale contained 16 items. This current study used seven items adapted from the Buchanan et al.
(2007) study (see Table 2). The items were measured using a 7-point-Likert scale (1=not at all to
7=very much). All of the items were averaged in order to create a privacy concern scale (α = .79).
General attitude toward Government. Because this study relates to national security and
government surveillance, it was important to measure each participants’ attitude toward the
current U.S. government. The items used to measure attitude toward the government were
adapted from Witte’s (2000; Witte 1994; Witte et al., 1996; Witte et al., 1998) EPPM attitude
scale. This variable was measured using uses six semantic differential scales (see Table 1). The
items were then averaged in order to create a government attitude scale (α = .96).

Table 2. Variables, items, means and standard deviations
Variable

Items

α

Mean*

Standard
Deviation

.82 5.09

.99

Perceived Susceptibility
 It is likely that I will be a victim of terrorism.
 It is possible that I will be a victim of terrorism.
 I am at risk of being a victim of terrorism.

.87 4.12

1.31

Perceived Severity

.83 6.1

1.07

.93 4.33

2.99

.93 4.38

1.50

Perceived
Threat

 I believe the risk of terrorism is serious
 I believe the risk of terrorism is significant
 I believe the risk of terrorism is severe.
Government
Surveillance
Efficacy
Response Efficacy
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 Government surveillance of phone and Internet
communications works to prevent terrorism.
 Government surveillance of phone and Internet
communications is effective in preventing terrorism.
 If government surveillance of phone and Internet
communications is increased, I am less likely to be
affected by terrorism.
 Increased government surveillance of phone and
Internet communications is important to combat the
threat of terrorism.
Self-Efficacy

.91 4.26

1.57

.89 5.20

1.10

.86 5.13

1.21

.85 5.36

1.18

 I am able to allow increased government surveillance
of phone and Internet communications in order to
prevent terrorism.
 Allowing increased government surveillance is easy
to do in order to prevent terrorism.
 Allowing increased government surveillance to
prevent terrorism is convenient.

Individual
reporting
Efficacy
Response Efficacy
 Individual reporting of suspicious activity to law
enforcement works to prevent terrorism.
 Individual reporting of suspicious activity to law
enforcement is effective in preventing terrorism.
 If I report suspicious activity to law enforcement, I
am less likely to be affected by terrorism.
 Individual reporting of suspicious activity is
important to combat the threat of terrorism.
Self-Efficacy
 I am able to report suspicious activities to law
enforcement in order to prevent terrorism.
 Reporting suspicious activity to law enforcement is
easy to do in order to prevent terrorism.
 Reporting suspicious activity to law enforcement to
prevent terrorism is convenient.
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Intent
(Government
surveillance)

 I intend to consent to increased government
surveillance of phone and Internet communications in
order to help prevent terrorism.
 I intend to contact my state and federal legislators
about increasing government surveillance in order to
help prevent terrorism.
 I intend to talk to my friends about allowing
increased government surveillance in order to combat
terrorism.

.87 3.83

1.64

Attitudes
(Government
surveillance)

Semantic differential scales: bad-good; undesirabledesirable; unfavorable-favorable; not effectiveeffective; and disapprove-approve.

.95 4.41

1.72

Intentions
(Individual
Reporting)

 I intend to report suspicious activity to law
enforcement in order to help prevent terrorism.
 I intend to contact law enforcement if I see an
individual acting suspicious.
 I intend to talk to my friends about contacting law
enforcement to help prevent terrorism.

.88 5.22

1.10

Attitudes
(individual
reporting)

Semantic differential scales: bad-good; undesirabledesirable; unfavorable-favorable; not effectiveeffective; and disapprove-approve.

.94 5.74

1.26

Cognitive
Dissonance






I regret reading this news story.
CNN as a news source makes me uncomfortable
I disliked reading this news story.
I agreed with the stance taken in this news story.
(reverse coded)
I felt uncomfortable while reading this news story.
I enjoyed reading this news story. (reverse coded)
I like CNN as a news source. (reverse coded)
This story made me question my own beliefs.
(removed)
I disliked the topic of this news story

.79 3.24

1.08

 I tend to avoid thoughts about terrorism.
 I try not to think about terrorism.
 I avoid discussing terrorism with friends and family.

.90 4.06

1.60






Defense
avoidance
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Message
Minimization

 This article was: [exaggerated]; [distorted],
[overblown], and [overstated].

.96 3.27

1.50

Perceived
Manipulation

 This article was: [manipulative], [misleading],
[exploitative].
 This article tried to manipulate me.

.94 3.22

1.50

Fear

 How much did this article make you feel:
[frightened]; [tense]; [nervous]; [anxious];
[uncomfortable]; [nauseous].

.95 2.82

1.59

Privacy
concern

 In general, how concerned are you about your privacy
while you are using the Internet?
 In general, how concerned are you about your privacy
while talking on your phone or cellphone?
 Are you concerned about people you do not know
obtaining personal information about you from your
online activities?
 Are you concerned that an email you send may be
read by someone else besides the person you sent it
to?
 Are you concerned that an email you send someone
may be inappropriately forwarded to others?
 Are you concerned about online identity theft?
 Are you concerned who might access your
personal.929 records electronically?

.92 4.62

1.53

General
Attitude
toward U.S.
Government

Semantic differential scales: bad-good; disapproveapprove; unfavorable-favorable; not effective-effective;
and untrustworthy-trustworthy.

.96 3.86

1.57

*Note: All of the items were scored using a seven-point Likert-type scale.

Participants were asked two additional yes/no items regarding their experiences with
terrorism or online identity theft. Because this study focused on online surveillance and privacy,
the question about identity theft was used as a control variable to determine if privacy concern
was impacted by identity theft. More specifically, participants were asked if they (or anyone
close to them) had been a victim of terrorism or identity theft. Finally, participants were asked
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demographic questions pertaining to age, gender, education, political affiliate and race/ethnicity.
This study, including all of the measures/items and stimuli contained in appendix A, were
reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) before the experiment was
conducted.
Three manipulation tests were conducted to ensure that the threat, efficacy and fear
variables were being manipulated properly. The first manipulation test was conducted on the
nine stimulus articles. For this test, 36 respondents were recruited, using a mix of convenience
and snowball sampling of students at a mid-sized university located in the Northeastern United
States. Though the results were not significant, the test did indicate that the high threat groups
were perceiving an increased threat as compared to the other groups and the high efficacy groups
were perceiving an increased efficacy as compared to the other groups. A second manipulation
test was conducted during a pretest of the experiment. The pretest had sixty-six respondents who
were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Respondents were randomly placed into one
of the eight experimental groups or the control group. To test the manipulation of the threat
variable, a Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted using the threat level (high/low/control) as the
between-subjects factor and level of perceived threat as the dependent variable. The result was
not statistically significant (x2 (2, n = 66) = 2.61, ns). The means appeared to be heading in the
right direction, but there was only a slight difference between the groups. The groups with a high
threat manipulation had a perceived threat mean of 4.49 (SD = 1.18), which was marginally
higher than the groups who received the low threat manipulation (M = 4.22, SD = 1.26) and the
control group (M = 4.0, SD = .97). Another Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted using the efficacy
level (high/low/control) as the between-subjects factor and level of perceived efficacy as the
dependent variable. To check the efficacy at this level, an overall composite of efficacy was
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created, combining both government surveillance efficacy and individual reporting efficacy
variables (α = .91). The result was not statistically significant (x2 (2, n = 66) = 3.12, ns). The
groups who received the high efficacy manipulations had a perceived efficacy mean of 4.34 (SD
= 1.12), which was higher than the groups who received the low efficacy manipulations (M =
3.92, SD = 1.10). However, the high efficacy group was not higher than the control group (M =
4.38, SD =.88), which suggested that the efficacy in the high efficacy stimulus articles should be
adjusted to ensure a sufficient manipulation. In addition, Witte (1998) suggests that there is a
positive correlation between perceived fear and threat, where increased perceived threat will
result in increased fear. A Spearman correlation showed that there was a statistically significant
positive correlation between fear and perceived threat (rs = .49, n = 66, p <.05). Overall, the
results indicated that the means were moving in the correct direction, but most were not yet
significant. This could have been the result of the small sample size. The stimulus articles was
modified with changes to substantive content and headings to help increase the effects of the
manipulations. Specifically, the wording of the headings was changed to more precisely
accentuate the levels of threat and efficacy. The size of the headings was also enlarged, to help
draw readers’ attention. Some of the wording in the stimulus articles was revised to better
highlight the threat and efficacy manipulations. The third, and final, manipulation check was
conducted during the experiment, which is described in detail later in this study.
During the pretest, the variable scales were tested for reliability. All of the scales were
found to be reliable: threat severity α = .85; threat susceptibility α = .81; response efficacy
government surveillance α = .94; self-efficacy government surveillance α = .89; response
efficacy individual reporting α = .91; self-efficacy government surveillance α = .86; attitude
toward government surveillance α = .90; attitude toward individual reporting α = .93; intent
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toward government surveillance α = .84; intent toward individual reporting α = .86; avoidance α
= .70; minimization α = .98; manipulation α = .95; fear α = .96; dissonance α = .77; and privacy
concern α = .96. The avoidance scale was close to being unreliable, so one of the items was
changed, using Witte’s (2000) list of avoidance items.
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Chapter 5: Results
This chapter offers an in-depth explanation of the manipulation check and the results for
each of the hypotheses. A variety of statistical analyses were used including, Kruskal-Wallis,
Mann-Whitney U, Spearman correlation, hierarchical multiple regression and path analysis.
Nonparametric statistical tests were used because the variable normality was not present. The
betas reported in these results are all standardized.
Manipulation and Validity Checks
As noted, the third manipulation check was conducted during the experiment to test that
the threat, efficacy and fear variables were properly manipulated. For the threat variable, a
Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted using the threat level (high/low/control) as the betweensubjects factor and level of perceived threat as the dependent variable. The groups with a high
threat manipulation had a perceived threat mean of 5.23 (SD = .94), which was higher than the
groups who received the low threat manipulation (M = 5.03, SD = .98). It was also higher than
the control group (M = 4.78, SD = 1.14). This result was statistically significant (x2 (2, 360) =
6.71, p < .05). The means were not as different as the researcher expected them to be. The post
hoc Tukey test indicated that the high threat groups perceived a significantly higher level of
threat than the control group but was not significantly different from the low threat level groups.
This result could have an impact on the EPPM-related tests. However, EPPM suggests that high
perceived threat and high perceived efficacy will lead an individual toward a danger control
response, while high perceived threat and low perceived efficacy will result in a fear control
response. This can still be tested even if the perceived threat levels are high in all of the groups.
Another Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted using the efficacy level (high/low/control) as
the between-subjects factor and level of perceived efficacy as the dependent variable. To check
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the efficacy at this level, an overall composite of efficacy was created, combining both of the
government surveillance efficacy and individual reporting efficacy variables (α = .93). The
groups who received the high efficacy manipulations had a perceived efficacy mean of 4.97 (SD
= 1.01), which was higher than the groups who received the low efficacy manipulations (M =
4.62, SD = 1.19) and the control group (M = 4.62, SD =1.10). This result was statistically
significant (x2 (2, n = 360) = 7.46, p < .05). Witte (1998) suggests that there is a positive
correlation between fear and threat, where increased perceived threat will result in increased fear.
A Pearson correlation suggested that this was the case here as well. There was a positive
correlation between fear and perceived threat (rs = .41, n = 360, p <.05). This result was as
expected. However, the correlation was not as strong as it had been in the pre-test (rs = .49, n =
66, p <.05), which could be a result of the different samples or sizes and composition of the
samples.
Validity of each participants’ responses were checked a few different ways during the
experiment. Two attention check questions were inserted into the instrument, asking respondents
to choose a specific response. If participants responded incorrectly, that participant was dropped
from the experiment and was randomly replaced by a new participant. In addition, the time it
took for each participant to read the stimulus article and complete the survey instrument was
monitored. The average time for participants to complete the survey was calculated, and any
participant who finished the survey in one-third of the time or less than the average was removed
from the experiment and randomly replaced with a new participant. These checks helped to
ensure that the collected responses were valid.
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Sample
The sample (N = 360) was 22.8% males, 76.7% females, with a mean age of 39.48 years.
Approximately 81% of the participants reported that they are “white.” The participants reported
political and educational diversity (see Table 3). Though the mean age of the sample was close to
40, the majority of the sample was under 45, which is young. However, there is no evidence
from the statistical analyses that age is a confounding variable in relation to any of the key
variables.
Table 3. Respondent Characteristics
Characteristics

Gender
Male
Female
Choose not to identify
Hispanic or Latino (of
any race)
Ethnicity/race
African American
White
Asian/Pacific
Islander/other
Highest level of
education
High school degree or
some high school
Some college
Associates degree or
Trade/Vocational
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree or
more advanced degree
Political Affiliation
Democrat
Republican
Independent/other
Age
18-25

Percent
for all
respondents
(N = 360)
22.8%
76.7%
.6%
10.8%
10.0%
81.4%
8.6%

29.7%
22.8%
19.4%
20.8%
7.2%
31.1%
30.6%
38.3%
13.3%
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26-35
36-45
46-55
56 and above
No response
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33.3%
21.1%
16.9%
13.9%
1.4%

Hypotheses and Research Question Testing
Because of the lack of diversity with gender and race, a series of chi-square tests were
conducted to determine if there were any statistically significant differences between the
experimental groups based on gender and race. No significant difference was found. Multiple
two-way ANOVAs were also run to determine whether gender and race had any main or
interactive effects on the key dependent variables, but no significant differences were found. In
addition, an ANOVA was run to determine whether age had a significant effect on any of the
variables. Age was broken into five groups (Group 1: 18 – 25; Group 2: 26 – 35; Group 3: 36 –
45; Group 4: 46 – 55; and Group 5: 56 and older). A significant result was found as to general
attitudes toward the government. The difference was between Group 1 (M = 4.31, SD = 1.52)
and Group 5 (M = 3.43, SD = 1.59). General attitudes toward the government is not a key EPPM
variable, so the significance is not a cause for concern. However, any analyses looking
specifically at that variable were controlled for age. Additional chi-square tests and ANOVAs
were conducted to determine if there were statistically significant difference among the
experimental condition grounds for the other demographic and descriptive variables including,
age, education, political affiliation, general attitude toward the government, whether the
participant had been a victim of terrorism, and whether the participant had been a victim of
cyber-theft. No significant difference was found across the groups.
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Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1a, proposing that participants exposed to the high threat/high efficacy
government surveillance fear appeal would be more likely to choose the danger control route and
accept the message than those exposed to the high threat/low efficacy government surveillance
fear appeal, was not supported. Danger control is comprised of two variables, attitude and intent.
The items from those variables were combined to form a composite danger control scale (α =
.94, M = 4.25, SD = 1.60). A Kruskal-Wallis Test showed no significant differences in the
danger control level among the designated groups (χ2(2) = 1.66, ns).
A post-hoc Kruskal-Wallis Test was conducted to see if either of the two dependent
variables (attitude and intent) was significantly different between the groups. The results were
not significant for attitudes (χ2(2) = 1.61, ns) or intent (χ2(2) = 2.60, ns).
Hypothesis 1b, proposing that participants exposed to the high threat/high efficacy
individual reporting fear appeal would be more likely to choose the danger control route than
those exposed to the high threat/low efficacy fear appeal and the control group, was not
supported (χ2(2) = .45, ns). A post-hoc Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to see if either of the
two danger control variables was significantly different between the high threat individual
reporting groups or the control group. The results were not significant for attitudes (χ2(2) = .28,
ns) or intent (χ2(2) = .97, ns).
Because the EPPM hypotheses were not supported, additional post-hoc analysis offered a
closer examination of the EPPM variables. Some research suggests that the best predictors of
whether a message will be accepted are response efficacy and self-efficacy (Roskos-Ewoldsen, et
al, 2004; Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). To test this, a sequence of simple regressions
was conducted to determine how much each variable can predict danger control. The control
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group was removed from this analysis because there was no efficacy option in the control group
stimulus, and the control group answered items that responded to both efficacy options. The first
simple regression found that threat (β = .21, p < .05), which is threat severity and susceptibility
combined (see Table 2), can predict 4.6% of the variance in danger control (F (1,318) = 15.18, p
< .05). The second simple regression found that efficacy (β = .84, p < .05), which is response
efficacy and self-efficacy combined (see Table 2), can predict 72% of the variance in danger
control (F (1, 318) = 817.21, p < .05).
Research also suggests that the level of threat is a better predictor of fear control than
efficacy (Roskos-Ewoldsen, et al, 2004). To test this, a sequence of simple regressions was
conducted to determine how much each variable can predict fear. The first simple regression
found that threat (β = -.17, p < .05) can predict three percent of the variance in fear control (F
(1,318) = 9.36, p < .05). The second simple regression found that efficacy (β = -.08, p < .05) can
predict .6 percent of the variance in fear control (F (1, 318) = 1.92, p < .05).
Research question 1
Research question 1 sought to determine if the danger control rate of the participants
exposed to the government surveillance high efficacy option was different from the danger
control rate of participants exposed to the individual reporting efficacy option. For this analysis,
the danger control variables, attitude and intent, for each efficacy group (government
surveillance/individual reporting were combined into one danger control variable (α = .95, M =
4.97, SD = 1.57). The 40 participants from the control group were not included in this analysis
for two reasons. First, they were not offered an efficacy option in their stimulus article. Second,
they answered items on both efficacy options, so they cannot be separated by the efficacy topic.
Then, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted with the efficacy topic (i.e., government

Privacy vs. Security: Fear appeals, terrorism and government surveillance

73

surveillance/individual reporting) as the independent variable. The results showed that the danger
control median for the individual reporting group (Md = 5.87, M = 5.75, SD = 1.07) was
significantly higher than the danger control median for the government efficacy group (Md =
4.25, M = 4.20, SD = 1.61; U = 20081, z = 8.80, p < .05). The results indicate a moderate effect
size (r = .49).
Hypothesis 2
There was no support for hypothesis 2a, proposing that participants exposed to the
government surveillance high efficacy option would have more favorable attitudes toward
government surveillance than those who were not (including the control group) (χ2(8, n = 360) =
7.2, ns). Hypothesis 2b, which isolated participants with an increased level of privacy concern,
proposed that participants who were exposed to the government surveillance high efficacy option
would have more positive attitudes toward government surveillance than participants exposed to
other messages and the control group. This hypothesis was not supported (χ2(8, n = 154) = 7.2,
ns).
There was support for hypothesis 2c, proposing that there would be a positive
relationship between the perceived threat of terrorism and attitudes toward government
surveillance of phone and internet communications. The relationship between the two variables
was tested using Spearman correlation. There was a moderate, positive correlation between
threat and attitudes toward government surveillance (rs = .32, n = 360, p < .05), which means that
high levels of perceived threat are associated with more positive attitudes toward government
surveillance. When isolating the response based on the efficacy topic, the statistical significance
remained: government surveillance (rs = .22, n = 160, p < .05), individual reporting (rs = .39, n =
160, p < .05) and control group (rs = .46, n = 40, p < .05). A test of the statistical significance
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between the government surveillance and individual reporting coefficients was not significant (z
= -1.74, p > .05).
Research Question 2
Research question 2 asked if there was an association between the level of privacy
concern and attitudes toward government surveillance for the entire sample. The relationship
between the two variables was tested using Spearman correlation. The results showed no
statistical relationship (rs = -.01, n = 360, ns).
Because no statistical relationship was found between privacy concern and attitudes
toward government surveillance, a post-hoc test was conducted to investigate the relationship
between the variables further. The privacy concern variable was divided into two groups (high
privacy concern and low privacy concern) to examine if there was a statistically significant
difference between the groups based on concerns about privacy. It is logical that those who have
a higher privacy concern will have more negative attitudes toward government surveillance. The
Likert scale used to measure the privacy concern items used 7-points (none at all, very little, a
little, a moderate amount, a lot, a great deal, very much). Those respondents who had a privacy
concern mean that corresponded with “a moderate amount” and less (i.e., 4.99 and below) were
placed in the low privacy concern group. Responses with a privacy concern mean that
corresponded with “a lot” and above (i.e. 5.0 and above) were placed in the high privacy concern
group. The privacy concern mean for the low group was 3.52, while the mean for the high group
was 6.09. Interestingly, the attitude toward government surveillance mean for the low privacy
concern group was 4.44, while the mean for the high group was 4.37. Though the privacy
concern means were quite different, the attitude toward government surveillance was basically
the same, and a Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the difference between the groups was not
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statistically significant (U = 16,018, z = .16, ns). There was no significant correlation between
privacy concern and attitudes toward government surveillance in the high (rs = -.11, n = 154, ns)
or low (rs = .05, n = 206, ns) privacy concern groups.
It is also logical that there would be a relationship between level of privacy concern and
intent to allow increased government surveillance. However, a post hoc Spearman’s rho
indicated that there was no significant relationship between the two variables (rs = .04, n = 360,
ns). The respondents were again divided in to high/low privacy concern groups to examine
whether there were statistically significant differences between the groups. The low privacy
concern group had an intent to allow government surveillance mean of 3.89, while the high
group had a mean of 3.74. A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that there was no significant
difference between the groups (U = 13,339, z = .93, ns).
Hypothesis 3
For the analysis, of hypotheses 3a and 3b, the fear control variables (avoidance,
manipulation and minimization) were combined to form a composite fear control variable (α =
.91, M = 10.53, SD = 3.52). Hypothesis 3a, which proposed that within the government
surveillance groups, privacy concern and fear control would have a positive correlation, was
unsupported (rs = .06, n = 160, ns).
Hypothesis 3b, proposing that within the individual reporting group, privacy concern and
fear control would have a positive correlation, was supported. The result indicated that the level
of privacy concern had a significant positive correlation with fear control (rs = .19, n = 160, p <
.05). Interestingly, this result suggests that as privacy concern increased, message rejection about
the effectiveness of reporting suspicious activities to authorities increased. In other words, the
message, to be accepted or rejected, was that individual reporting of suspicious activity can help
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combat terrorism. In this case, the results suggest that the higher the participants’ privacy
concern, the more likely that an individual would be to reject the message that reporting
suspicious activity to authorities helps to fight terrorism.
This result led to the question: As privacy concern increases, will the respondent be less
likely to contact authorities to report suspicious activity? Looking specifically at the individual
reporting group, a Spearman correlation was conducted to determine the relationships between
privacy concern, attitudes toward individual reporting of suspicious activities to authorities, and
the intent to report suspicious activity. There was not a significant relationship between privacy
concern and attitudes toward individual reporting (rs = .001, n = 160, ns). However, there was a
weak positive relationship between privacy concern and intent to report suspicious activity (rs =
.18, n = 160, p <.05). This would suggest that as privacy concern increases, the likelihood of
contacting authorities regarding suspicious activity also increases.
Post-hoc analyses were conducted to further investigate these results with the entire
sample. There was again a weak positive relationship between privacy concern and the intent to
report suspicious activity (rs = .17, n = 360, p < .05). There was no significant relationship
between privacy concern and attitudes toward reporting suspicious activity (rs = .17, n = 360, p <
.05).
Research Questions 3 and 4
Research questions 3 and 4 asked if dissonance was related to each of the EPPM
variables. In order to conduct this analysis, the response efficacy items for government
surveillance and individual reporting were averaged to create a single scale (α = .91, M = 4.77,
SD = 1.44). The same was done for the self-efficacy items. However, for self-efficacy, the first
question “I am able to [allow increased government surveillance/report suspicious activity] in
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order to prevent terrorism” had to be removed to make the scale reliable (α = .89, M = 4.95, SD =
1.57). For this analysis, the control group was removed because that group responded to items
relating to both efficacy options. Spearman rho was used for this analysis because the
distribution of the variables was not normal. According to the results, fear, response efficacy and
self-efficacy had weak statistical relationships with dissonance (see Table 4).
Table 4 Correlation Matrix for Dissonance and the EPPM Variables
Scale
1. Dissonance
2. Threat Severity
3. Threat Susceptibility
4. Fear
5. Response Efficacy
6. Self-Efficacy

1
--.09
.05
.27**
-.13*
-.17**

2

3

4

5

6

-.40**
.24**
.24**
.27**

-.46**
.15*
.23*

-.13*
.12*

-.73*

--

Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05 (2-tailed).

Research Question 5
Research question 5a asked if there was a significant relationship between dissonance and
fear control. To complete this analysis, all of the items for the fear control variables (avoidance,
manipulation and minimization) were combined to form a composite fear control variable (α =
.91, M = 10.53, SD = 3.52). For this analysis, the control group was omitted for the same reasons
as previously mentioned, with the primary reason being that they answered items regarding both
efficacy options. The relationship between the variables was measured using a Spearman
correlation. There was a strong relationship between the dissonance and fear control, rs = .57, n =
320, p<.001, indicating that when dissonance increases, message rejection increases.
Research question 5b asked if there was a significant relationship between dissonance
and danger control. For this analysis, the danger control variables (attitude and intent) were
combined to form a composite danger control variable (α = .95, M = 9.89, SD = 3.16). The
relationship between the variables was measured using Spearman correlation. There was a weak,
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negative relationship between dissonance and danger control, rs = -.21, n = 320, p < .001,
suggesting that when dissonance increases, message acceptance decreases.
Research question 5c asked whether dissonance can predict variance in fear control after
controlling for fear, perceived threat and perceived efficacy. First, a simple regression found that
dissonance (β = .58, p < .05) can predict 34% of the variance in fear control (F (1,358) = 162.69,
p < .05). Next, a hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to test how much that number is
decreased when controlling for the other EPPM variable. Four outliers were removed from the
analysis because of issues with the Mahalanobis distances and standardized residuals. After their
removal, preliminary analyses indicated that there were no violations of the assumptions of
normality, multicollinearity, linearity and homoscedasticity. Each of the variables was entered
separately to determine how much variance each explained. The results suggest that fear
explained little of the variance in fear control, while dissonance explained the most variance.
Model 4, which included all of the variables, explained 37 percent of the variance, F (4, 311) =
47.14, p <.05. Dissonance explained 30 percent of the variance in fear control after controlling
for fear, perceived threat and perceived efficacy (see Table 5).
Next, Preacher and Hayes’ (2008; Hong, 2011) bootstrapping method was used to
determine whether dissonance would directly and indirectly affect fear control (message
rejection) when mediated by threat severity, threat susceptibility, response efficacy and selfefficacy. Preacher and Hayes (2008) suggest that their bootstrapping analysis is superior to
SOBEL when testing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. According to Preacher and
Hayes (2008), Sobel’s delta method is best used with “very large samples” that assume
“multivariate normality” (p. 883). Preacher and Hayes (2008) found that in smaller samples, the
total indirect effect is not always found; however, they suggest that a significant total indirect
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effect is not required and that specific indirect effects are still noteworthy even if the total
indirect effect is not significant. In addition, their bootstrapping method allows for multiple
mediators (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Preacher and Hayes (2008) created a macro syntax called
“Indirect” that can be used with SPSS to determine indirect mediate effects. Their bootstrapping
method is useful in that it uses a resampling technique where a sample of the cases taken from
the full sample are used to create a new sampling distribution, or rather, an “empirical,
nonparametric approximation of the sampling distributions of the indirect effects of interest”
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008, p. 833; Hong, 2011). This method is useful because it does not rely on
the assumption of a normal sampling distribution (Preacher & Hayes, 2008, Hong, 2011). This
method also is known to reduce Type 1 error (Hong, 2011).
The results show dissonance has a negative relationship with threat severity, response
efficacy and self-efficacy (see Figure 6 and Table 5). This means that as efficacy increases,
dissonance decreases. Interestingly, it also means that as threat severity increases, dissonance
decreases. The effect of dissonance on fear control without taking the other variables into
account is significant (path coefficient =.58, SE =.05, p<.001.) When controlling for the
mediating variables, the effect of dissonance on fear control remains significant (path coefficient
=.56, SE =.05, p<.001) (see Figure 6). The results also indicate that threat severity and response
efficacy are statistically significant as mediators because the bias-corrected 95% confidence
intervals do not contain zero. The model explains 37 percent of the variance in fear control.
According to the bias-correct 95% confidence intervals, the total indirect effect of the model is
not significant (-.07 to .14).
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Perceived threat
severity
-.17***
-.12*
.02
Cognitive
Dissonance

Perceived threat
susceptibility

-.03

.56***
-.14**

-.18***

Fear Control
.18**

Perceived
response efficacy

-.11

Perceived selfefficacy

Figure 6: Relationship between cognitive dissonance, threat severity, threat susceptibility,
response efficacy, self-efficacy and fear control (message rejection). Standardized coefficients are
shown. Significance: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p< .05.
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Table 5 Results of Indirect Effects on Fear Control Using Bootstrapping

Total effect of Dissonance on Fear Control
Dissonance to mediators
Threat Severity
Threat Susceptibility
Response Efficacy
Self-Efficacy
Direct effects of mediators on Fear Control,
controlling for Dissonance
Threat Severity
Threat Susceptibility
Response Efficacy
Self-Efficacy
Direct effect of Dissonance on Fear Control
Indirect effects of Dissonance on Fear Control
Threat Severity
Threat Susceptibility
Response Efficacy
Self-efficacy
Total

Path
coefficient
.58***

SE
.05

-.12*
.02
-.14**
-.18***

.05
.06
.07
.07

-.17***
-.03
.18**
-.11
.56***

.06
.04
.05
.05
.05

.02
-.00
-.03
.02
.06

.01
.00
.01
.01
.01

Bias Corrected
Bootstrap 95%
confidence
interval

.002 to .058
-.016 to .004
-.069 to -.005
.000 to .060
-.017 to .052

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Total effect = The effect of Dissonance on Fear Control without taking the
moderating variables into account. Direct effect = The effect of Dissonance on Fear Control when controlling for the
moderating variables. Standardized coefficients are show.
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Table 2 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Fear Control
Model 1b
Variable

B

SE b

Constant

10.11

.41

.15

.12

Fear
Threat

Model 2b
β

.07

b

SE b

Model 3b
Β

15.07

1.09

.49

.14

.22**

-1.15

.24

-.31***

Efficacy

b

SE b

12.66***
.07
.07
.07

β

b

SE b

8.19

1.14

β

15.67

1.17

.49

.14

.22***

.08

.12

-1.08

.24

-.29***

-.81

.20

-.20

.14

-.08

.07

.12

.03

1.83

.15

.58***

Dissonance
F Value
1.42
R2
.005
2
Adjusted R
.001
R2 Change
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05

Model 4b

9.13***
.08
.07
.006

47.14***
.37
.37
.30

.03
-.21***
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Research question 5d asked whether dissonance can predict variance in danger control
after controlling for fear, perceived threat and perceived efficacy. For this analysis, the danger
control variables, attitude and intent, were combined to form a composite danger control scale (α
= .94, M = 4.25, SD = 1.60). First, a simple regression found that dissonance (β = -.21, p < .05)
can predict four percent of the variance in danger control (F (1,318) = 14.23, p < .05). Next, a
hierarchical multiple regression was conducted to test how much that number is decreased when
controlling for the other EPPM variable. Eight outliers were removed from the analysis because
of issues with the Mahalanobis distances and standardized residuals. After their removal,
preliminary analyses indicated that there were no violations of the assumptions of normality,
multicollinearity, linearity and homoscedasticity. Each of the variables was entered
independently to determine how much of the variance each one explained. The results show that
perceived efficacy explained the most variance. Model 4, which included all of the variables,
explained 76 percent of the variance, F (4, 307) = 249.20, p <.05. Dissonance only explained an
additional .3 percent of the variance in danger control after controlling for fear, perceived threat
and perceived efficacy and was not statistically significant (see Table 8).
The Preacher and Hayes’ (2008; Hong, 2011) bootstrapping method was used a second
time to determine whether dissonance would directly and indirectly affect danger control
(message acceptance) when mediated by threat severity, threat susceptibility, response efficacy
and self-efficacy. As before, dissonance has a negative relationship with threat severity,
response efficacy and self-efficacy (see Figure 7 and Table 7). The effect of dissonance on
danger control without taking the other variables into account is significant (path coefficient
=-.231, SE =.15, p<.001.) However, when controlling for the mediating variables, the effect of
dissonance on danger control is no longer significant (path coefficient =-.05, SE =.08, ns.) (see
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Figure 7). The results also indicate that response efficacy, and self-efficacy are statistically
significant as mediators because the bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals do not contain zero.
The model explains 72 percent of the variance in danger control. According to the bias-correct
95% confidence intervals, the total indirect effect of the model is significant (-.73 to -.16).

Perceived threat
severity
.02
-.12*
.02
Cognitive
Dissonance

Perceived threat
susceptibility

-.03

-.05
-.14**

-.18***

Danger Control
.31***

Perceived
response efficacy

-.59***

Perceived selfefficacy

Figure 7: Relationship between cognitive dissonance, threat severity, threat susceptibility,
response efficacy, self-efficacy and danger control (message acceptance). Standardized
coefficients are shown. Significance: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p< .05.
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Table 7 Results of Indirect Effects on Danger Control Using Bootstrapping

Total effect of Dissonance on Danger Control
Dissonance to mediators
Threat Severity
Threat Susceptibility
Response Efficacy
Self-Efficacy
Direct effects of mediators on Danger Control,
controlling for Dissonance
Threat Severity
Threat Susceptibility
Response Efficacy
Self-Efficacy
Direct effect of Dissonance on Danger Control
Indirect effects of Dissonance on Danger Control
Threat Severity
Threat Susceptibility
Response Efficacy
Self-efficacy
Total

Path
coefficient
-.21***

SE
.14

-.12*
.02
-.14**
-.18***

.05
.06
.07
.07

.02
-.03
.31***
.59***
-.05

.13
.10
.16
.17
.14

-.00
-.00
-.04
-.10
-.14

.01
.01
.05
.10
.14

Bias Corrected
Bootstrap 95%
confidence
interval

-.04 to .01
-.03 to .01
-.27 to -.03
-.52 to -.11
-.73 to -.16

Note: ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. Total effect = The effect of Dissonance on Fear Control without taking the
moderating variables into account. Direct effect = The effect of Dissonance on Fear Control when controlling for the
moderating variables. Standardized coefficients are show.
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Table 8 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Danger Control
Model 1b
Variable

B

SE b

Constant

4.71

.18

.11

.05

Fear
Threat

Model 2b
β

.11*

B

SE

3.15

.49

.01

.06

.36

.11

Efficacy

Model 3b
β

b

SE b

.25

.26

.01

-.01

.03

.21**

.01
.97

7.82***
.05
.04
.03

β

b

β

SE b

.57

.31

-.01

.004

.03

.004

.05

-.01

.003

.05

.002

.03

.87***

.96

.03

.86***

-.07

.04

-.05

Dissonance
F Value
4.06*
R2
.01
Adjusted R2
.01
2
R Change
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.

Model 4b

328.61***
.76
.76
.71

249.20***
.76
.76
.003
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Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5a proposed that, when isolating participants who were exposed to the
government surveillance efficacy options, privacy concern would be associated with dissonance.
This hypothesis was not supported (rs = .08, n = 160, ns). Because the eight experimental stimuli
pertained to terrorism and some sort of government interaction through either individual
contacting of government officials or through increased government surveillance, a post hoc
analysis was conducted after combining the respondents of the experimental groups to determine
if dissonance was associated with privacy concern. The results indicated that there was a weak
positive relationship between the variables (rs = .12, n = 320, p < .05).
Because inconsistencies between beliefs and intent can cause dissonance, a post-hoc
analysis was conducted to test the following hypothesis: Privacy concern and intentions to allow
government surveillance will predict dissonance. A multiple regression was conducted to test
this hypothesis, and the results were statistically significant. Privacy concern and intention to
allow government surveillance explained 5.7% of the variance in dissonance (F (2, 357) = 10.82,
p <.05). Both privacy concern (β = .14, p < .05) and intent to allow government surveillance (β =
-.21, p < .05) were significant.
Hypothesis 5b proposed that, when isolating the participants who were exposed to the
government surveillance efficacy options, there would exist a negative relationship between
attitudes toward government surveillance and dissonance. This hypothesis was supported. The
relationship between the two variables was examined using Spearman correlation. The results
showed a weak negative correlation between attitude toward the government and dissonance, r =
-.24, n = 160, p < .05, illustrating that a negative attitude toward government surveillance was
associated with increased dissonance within that group.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
This study sought to test the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) using terrorism as
the threat and two distinct efficacy options. In addition, a privacy concern variable was included
to determine if attitudes toward privacy play a role in accepting or rejecting government
surveillance to fight terrorism. This study tested the relationship between dissonance and
message rejection and acceptance. Finally, this study examined whether dissonance and the
privacy paradox were related. This section will discuss the results and theoretical implications.
EPPM
EPPM suggests that when a person is exposed to a fear appeal that contains a high threat
and high efficacy, the person will be more likely to accept the efficacy message as compared to
those who are exposed to a high threat/low efficacy message (Witte, 1994; Witte et al., 1998).
Thus, it is logical that when respondents were exposed to the high threat/high efficacy messages,
they would be more likely to accept those messages. That was not the case, however, in this
study. There were no significant differences among the groups. Although this result appears
surprising, a possible explanation could be that the level of efficacy was not high enough to
surpass the level of threat. Witte et al. (1994; 1998), proposed that persuasive influence happens
when the level of perceived efficacy surpasses the level of the threat. In this study, the perceived
threat severity mean for the entire sample was high: 6.07 out of a seven-point Likert scale. When
combining threat severity and threat susceptibility, the mean for perceived threat was 5.09.
However, the efficacy mean for the entire sample was 4.77 out of seven. It is possible that these
levels of perceived threat and efficacy affected the results. For example, the high threat/high
efficacy government surveillance group should, under EPPM, be more likely to accept the
message, that government surveillance can effectively combat terrorism, as compared to the
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other groups. That was not found in this study, likely because of the higher level of perceived
threat and lower level of perceived efficacy. The results showed that the perceived threat mean
for the high threat/high efficacy government surveillance group was 5.14 out of seven, while the
efficacy mean was 4.55. If the efficacy level was not high enough to overcome the threat, then,
under the assumptions of EPPM, the participants would not be persuaded to accept the fear
appeal message.
The high threat level could be the result of the January 6, 2017, shooting at the Fort
Lauderdale airport, where a gunman took the lives of five people. This shooting took place only
a week before the experiment was conducted. With the attack being reported in the news,
terrorism may have been on the participants’ minds. It could also be the case that the participants
consider terrorism to be a high threat in general. There is evidence that a pre-existing fear of the
threat could affect the EPPM results. A study by Muthusamy, Levine, and Weber (2009)
indicated that if a group of participants have high, preexisting fear regarding the topic of study,
manipulating the levels of threat and efficacy will not have an impact on danger control and fear
control responses. In other words, if the participants’ fear of terrorism is already high, it is
unlikely that their fear can be further increased. In the Muthusamy et al. (2009) study,
participants had a high, preexisting fear of HIV/AIDS, and although the levels of threat were
manipulated in the message stimuli, the participants in the high threat groups did not have
significantly higher levels of fear as compared to the low threat and control groups. Muthusamy
et al. (2009) discovered that, because fear of HIV/AIDS could not be further increased,
manipulation of the threat level did not have a significant impact on the participants’ attitudes
and intentions toward condom use to avoid contracting the disease. Moreover, Muthusamy et al.
(2009) found that manipulating levels of efficacy did not significantly impact attitudes and

90

intentions toward condom use. The authors suggested this could be because the fear of
HIV/AIDS was already so high that it could not be surpassed by the efficacy of condom use
(Muthusamy et al., 2009).
This study had a comparable result. Similar to the Muthusamy et al. (2009) study, the
threat levels were high and manipulating efficacy did not impact the rate of message acceptance.
If the participants already had a high pre-existing fear about terrorism, and believed the threat to
be significant, it is likely that the level of efficacy could not overcome the level of threat in a way
that would persuade the participants to choose the danger control process and accept the
message. With the level of threat severity high in all of the groups, it is possible that no type of
manipulation of threat or efficacy levels could persuade the participants to accept the message
because the efficacy could not overcome the level of perceived threat. These results suggest that
fear appeals will not make an individual more likely to accept a message advocating for
increased government surveillance to fight terrorism because the level of perceived efficacy is
not sufficient to overcome the threat. More broadly, Muthusamy et al. (2009) proposed that fear
appeals are not effective in situations where the rate of fear is already very high. The results of
this study could support such a proposition. However, proposing that fear appeals are not at all
effective in high preexisting fear cases is drastic. Instead, the explanation may be that the success
of a fear appeal in a high fear situation relies heavily on the level of perceived efficacy. As will
be discussed below, there is evidence that perceived efficacy is the variable most likely to predict
message acceptance. Thus, it is likely that if there is a preexisting high rate of fear, a successful
fear appeal must have an efficacy option that is sufficient to overcome the perceived threat.
Further research is necessary to determine if the fear of terrorism in the United States is
so great that it renders a fear appeal unworkable. Muthusamy et al. (2009) tested the participants’
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level of fear regarding AIDS/HIV. However, in this current study, the fear variable tested the
participants’ general feelings of fear after reading the article, as suggested by Witte (2000). This
study did not specifically ask participants how much fear they felt regarding terrorism. A future
study could examine these results further by asking all participants about their fear of terrorism
to better determine if a high rate of fear has an effect on the EPPM results.
This study also hypothesized that participants exposed to the government surveillance
high efficacy option would have more favorable attitudes toward government surveillance than
those who were not exposed to this message. However, this hypothesis was not supported. The
idea behind this hypothesis was that people may generally be opposed to increased government
surveillance but a high efficacy fear appeal message may persuade some people to more readily
accept government surveillance to combat terrorism. It is possible that the high perceived threat
of terrorism affected results. As Muthusamy et al (2009) indicated, if the fear of a topic is high,
attitudes will likely not be manipulated in the way that EPPM suggests they should be.
Research suggests that the best predictors of whether a message will be accepted are
response efficacy and self-efficacy (Roskos-Ewoldsen, et al, 2004; Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, &
Rogers, 2000). This study found evidence to support that proposition. Response efficacy and
self-efficacy combined predicted 72 percent of the variance in danger control (message
acceptance), while threat severity and susceptibility combined predicated only four percent of the
danger control variance. Together, threat and efficacy predicted 76 percent of the danger control
variance. These results highlight the importance of efficacy within fear appeals.
Research also suggests that the level of threat is a better predictor of fear control than
efficacy (Roskos-Ewoldsen, et al, 2004). The results of the current study found that threat
susceptibility and severity combined predicted three percent of the variance in fear control, while
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efficacy predicted .6 percent of the variance. This indicates that threat is a better predictor of
message rejection than efficacy. However, both threat and efficacy predict only a small amount
of the variance in message rejection, suggesting that there are other variables that can better
predict whether an individual will choose the fear control process. The discussion of dissonance
below offers some insight on this issue.
This study did find evidence that the type of efficacy is of consequence when drafting a
fear appeal. The results indicated that the participants in the individual reporting groups were
more likely to choose danger control and accept the message than those in the government
surveillance efficacy groups. This suggests that the type of efficacy offered in a fear appeal needs
to be taken into consideration, particularly when the audience does not find the efficacy option
appealing. It also suggests that the participants were more willing to accept a message
advocating for individual reporting to fight terrorism, rather than increasing government
surveillance, which makes sense given the uproar over privacy concerns that took place after
Snowden leaked the PRISM project information.
Overall, not all of the results are consistent with EPPM. However, the results do highlight
the importance of efficacy in relation to danger control and message acceptance. The type of
efficacy used and the amount of efficacy respondents perceived were key indicators as to
whether the respondent would accept the message. Moreover, there is evidence that because the
threat level was so high, the experimental manipulations of threat and efficacy had little impact
on respondents’ decision to accept or reject a message. As Muthusamy et al. (2009) suggest, this
could mean that using fear appeals on groups who already have a high perception of threat or
fear is ill advised. However, it may also mean that perceived efficacy is the key to fear appeal
persuasion. These results suggest that influencers will need to seriously research and consider the
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audience who will be receiving the fear appeal. The influencer will need to understand what
efficacy options are available to the audience and how useful those options are. Most
importantly, the author of a fear appeal needs to ensure that the perceived efficacy is strong
enough to overcome the threat. If efficacy cannot surpass perceived threat, there is little
likelihood of a successful, persuasive fear appeal.
Privacy
The concept of privacy was central to this study. Research suggests privacy can be
conceptualized as a freedom from surveillance (Solove 2002, 2008), which was the
conceptualization used in this study. Theoretically, those who are concerned about privacy
should be less likely to allow increased government surveillance of phone and Internet
communications. That being noted, the privacy paradox (Acquisti, 2004; Acquisti & Grossklags,
2005; Acquisti, Brandimarte & Loewenstein, 2015) is also a theory that must be considered.
Westin, Altman, Petronio, and Solove’s (2008) theories suggest that privacy is about
controlling access to oneself and controlling access to information about oneself (Margulis,
2011). These theories support the proposition that as privacy concern increases, attitudes toward
government surveillance should decrease. It is logical that those with a high privacy concern
would abhor the idea of increased government surveillance of their private communications.
However, this study did not find that result. Overall, there was no significance correlation
between privacy concern and attitudes toward government surveillance. To analyze this result
further, the participants were divided into low and high privacy concern groups. When
considering that the meaning of privacy encompasses the freedom from surveillance, it is logical
that the high privacy concern group would have a much lower tolerance for government
surveillance. And yet, the high privacy concern group’s mean regarding attitude toward
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government surveillance was practically the same as the low privacy concern’s mean, which is
not in line with the theories of privacy set forth by Altman, Westin, Petronio and Solove. This
result could be explained two ways. The first explanation focuses on consent and control of
information. When Snowden leaked information about the U.S. Government’s PRISM project,
U.S. citizens discovered that their personal communications may have been monitored without
their knowledge or consent, which was viewed as a violation of privacy. However, if people are
offered the option of allowing increased government surveillance, and knowingly choose that
option, the government’s access to their personal communications may not be considered a
privacy violation because there was consent. This speaks to the legal concept of reasonable
expectation of privacy. Often in tort and Fourth Amendment privacy violation cases, part of the
determination depends on whether the individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy. If
someone consents to allow government surveillance of personal communications, that person no
longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in those communications. Thus, while the
government’s secret monitoring of personal communication is considered a privacy violation,
consenting to increased government surveillance may not be viewed as a privacy issue to some
people. The second explanation involves the privacy paradox, which suggests that people are
willing to give up privacy in exchange for some sort of benefit (Acquisti, 2004). In this case, the
benefit could be safety and security. For example, hypothesis 2c, proposing that there would be a
positive relationship between perceived threat and attitudes toward government surveillance, was
supported. As the respondent’s perceived threat of terrorism increased, they were more likely to
be in favor of increased government surveillance. Thus, according to the results, attitudes toward
government surveillance were influenced by perceived threat level and not by privacy concern.
These results suggest that people are willing to give up privacy in exchange for security.
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Moreover, safety may be more important to some people than keeping the government out of
private communications.
The implications of these results, that respondents are more concerned about security
than privacy, are troubling. The concept of privacy has grown and evolved since Warren and
Brandeis’ 1890 Harvard Law Review article. It is an ever-changing concept, which theorist have
had a difficult time pinning down and defining. It is likely that as the threat of terrorism
continues to grow, it will influence society’s concerns about privacy. The danger in this can be
illustrated using a freedom of speech analogy. When First Amendment lawyers discuss the
regulation of speech, they often reference the “slippery slope,” or the idea that, if not highly
controlled and monitored, regulations on speech can snowball out of control with the result being
that all speech is regulated. Privacy has its own slippery slope. The more relaxed people become
about privacy and the more willing they are to allow others, including the government, to invade
their privacy, the more likely that the situation could snowball out of control, with the result
being no privacy for anyone. There are some people who argue that privacy is already extinct.
That argument assumes, however, that privacy can be clearly defined and categorized. Research
suggests this is not the case. Scholars such as Altman, Westin, Petronio, Solove and Nissenbaum
have been clear that privacy is difficult to define and has different meanings to different people.
The argument that privacy is extinct also does not take into account Fourth Amendment privacy.
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information contained on their cell phones (Riley v. California). At least in the sense of the
Fourth Amendment, there is still an argument that privacy exists. Society’s reaction to
Snowden’s leak of the PRISM project also suggests that privacy is a right that is highly valued in
our society, yet it is a concept that must evolve with technology. Changes in society’s
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understanding of privacy is not necessarily a bad thing. However, giving up privacy can lead to
dire consequences. Once privacy is relinquished, it is not something that can easily be regained
later.
Another hypothesis was that privacy concern and fear control (message rejection) would
be correlated. In this study, there were two efficacy messages: 1) increased government
surveillance can work to combat terrorism and 2) individual reporting of suspicious activity can
help to fight terrorism. If the participants gravitated toward the danger control process, then they
were accepting the fear appeal message. However, if they gravitated toward the fear control
process, they were effectively rejecting the fear appeal message. When looking specifically at the
government surveillance message groups, there was no significant correlation between privacy
concern and message rejection. However, when isolating the individual reporting groups, there
was a significant positive correlation between privacy concern and fear control. The correlation
was weak, but it indicated that as privacy concern increases the tendency to reject the message
increases. In other words, as the participant’s privacy concern increases, the participant will be
more likely to reject the message that reporting suspicious activity to authorities can combat
terrorism.
This result then led to the following question: If participants with increased privacy
concerns are more likely to reject the message that individual reporting of suspicious activities
helps to fight terrorism, does that mean that participants with increased privacy concerns will be
less likely to intend to report suspicious activity to authorities? In this case, the answer to that
question was in the negative. The results suggested that as the level of privacy concern increases,
the likelihood that the participant will report suspicious activity also increases. It may initially
appear that these two results conflict with each other. On the one hand, as privacy concern
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increases, the participant is more likely to reject the message that individual reporting of
suspicious activity can help fight terrorism, on the other hand, as privacy concern increases, the
participant is more likely to intend to report suspicious activity to authorities. However, as is
clarified below, these results can be explained using conceptualizations of privacy and the
privacy paradox.
The broad understanding of privacy boundary building indicates that as privacy concern
increases, the individual will be less likely to want to open an avenue of communication between
herself and government authorities. For example, Altman’s (1976) theory of privacy, which
continues to be widely cited today, suggests that privacy can be conceptualized as the “selective
control of access to the self or to one’s group” (Altman, 1976, p. 8; Altman, 1977; Marguilis,
2011). According to Altman (1976), this conceptualization allows for certain properties that can
help further the understanding of privacy. First, privacy can be viewed using several different
social units (such as individuals or groups). Second, privacy is recognized as a “bidirectional”
process, meaning that information can flow from the individual or to the individual (Altman,
1976, p. 8). Third, the control of information is a selective and dynamic process that can
continually change. Altman (1976) viewed access to self is a “dynamic regulatory process” (p.
8). His theory suggests a dialectical tension between opening an avenue to share information
with others and closing that avenue. Altman viewed self-disclosure as openness and privacy as
closedness, which he believed were two separate processes that could be woven into a dialectic
model (Petronio, 2002). Petronio’s communication privacy management (CPM) theory builds off
Altman’s dialectical approach and proposes that self-disclosure and privacy are inseparable
features of a more defined and consolidated dialectic process (Margulis, 2011; Petronio, 2002).
Petronio (2002) views privacy as a constant battle that every person contends with every single
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day. Any disclosure that we make needs to be weighed through the dialectic give and take
process (Petronio, 2002). Regarding privacy, Petronio (2002) states:
We are constantly in a balancing act. We try to weigh the demands of the
situation with our needs and those of others around us. It gives us a sense
that we are the rightful owners of information about us. There are risks that
include making private disclosures to the wrong people, disclosing at a bad
time, telling too much about ourselves, or compromising others. (p.1)

Under this conceptualization of privacy, each person has built a metaphorical boundary around
herself/himself that is flexible and adaptable. During the course of each day, the person is
making decisions about whether to let information pass through that boundary. If a person loses
control of certain aspects of that boundary there can be turbulence, which could lead to a
violation of privacy (Petronio, 2002).
The boundary building conceptualization of privacy helps to explain why the increase in
privacy concern is related to an increase in fear control. The individual reporting efficacy
message used in the experiment sought to persuade participants that contacting authorities to
report suspicious activity is effective in combating terrorism. Rejecting this message means
pushing back on the idea that opening a line of communication with the government can work to
fight terrorism. Theoretically, the more an individual is concerned about privacy the more likely
the individual will be to reject a message that advocates for opening a line of communication
with government authorities. Thus, privacy concern should have a positive relationship with
message rejection (fear control), which it did here. Contacting police usually means having to
provide information such as name, phone number, address and current location. It could also
open an avenue for the police to contact the individual at a late time to gather more information.
Clearly, reporting suspicious activity to authorities is likely to lead to the release of private
information. If the individual opens that line of communication and then loses control of that
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boundary, then the resulting turbulence could lead to a violation of the privacy principles.
Petronio (2002) suggests that people want to keep control of their boundaries. A choice to reject
the idea that contacting authorities can fight terrorism is a choice to maintain control of privacy
boundaries.
At the same time, the results also found that as privacy concerns increased, the intention
to report suspicious activity to police also increased. Considering the theories of privacy and
boundary building, the relationship between privacy concern and intentions to contact authorities
should be negative. It may seem obvious that if an individual sees something suspicious that
person should call the police. However, that reasoning fails to consider the conceptualizations of
privacy. Scholars (Altman, 1976; Petronio, 2002; and Westin, 2003) make it clear that every
decision we make regarding communicating information to another person must involve a
decision about privacy. A positive correlation between privacy concerns and an intent to contact
authorities seems to be in contention with the understanding of privacy. The privacy paradox,
however, offers an explanation for this phenomenon. The privacy paradox suggests that people
are willing to give up privacy in exchange for a benefit. In this case, the benefit is safety and
security. This would explain why people with a high level of privacy concern would be willing
to open a communication boundary to report suspicious activity to the police. Nissenbaum’s
(2004) theory of contextual integrity offers another possible explanation. Contextual integrity
looks specifically at the flow of information from one person to another. It suggests that
decisions regarding the sharing of private information are made based on the context surrounding
the sharing of information and content of the information being shared. As long as the individual
feels that the correct information is shared in the correct context, there will be no breakdown of
contextual integrity and no privacy violation. In this case, it could be that people with a higher
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privacy concern do not view contacting the police to report suspicious activity as a privacy issue
because the information matches up with the context in which the information is being shared.
Normally, a privacy-minded individual may not willingly open an avenue with the government
in which the person must provide personal information such as name, phone number, address and
current location. However, if the person believes that sharing that private information with the
government makes sense in the context of reporting a possible crime, there may be no
breakdown of contextual integrity and no privacy violation. In other words, it makes contextual
sense to contact the police and tell them who and where you are when reporting suspicious
activity, so there would be no privacy violation. Future research regarding privacy concerns and
the intent to open an avenue of communication with the government would help to further
explain these results and how people understand the concept of privacy.
It is also likely that increased fear about the loss of security has an effect on privacy
concerns. Altman recognized that after the terror attacks of 2001, making sense of privacy has
become more muddled. In the Foreword to Petronio’s book, Boundaries of Privacy, Altman
states that the attack left us “unsure about how to cope with the immediate and long-term specter
of terrorism” (Petronio, 2002, p. xiii). Furthermore, he contended that society will face new
privacy challenges in the twenty-first century as technology evolves and our personal
information becomes more accessible to others. The literature review section of this study notes
that combating terrorism and privacy go hand-in-hand. As illustrated in case law (i.e., Berger v.
New York) and statutory law (i.e., FISA), in the fight against terrorism, the government relies
heavily on the interception of private communications. Thus, it is inevitable that a discussion
about national security must involve privacy. It is also quite probable that the terror attacks of
2001 have altered society’s understanding of privacy. Although scholars like Petronio (2002)
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suggest that privacy is important to people, there is also a willingness to open lines of
communication with the government in an effort to obtain security.
Research regarding privacy issues is important to a variety of groups. For example,
understanding society’s privacy concerns is important to legislators who write statutory laws
dealing with national security and privacy, to civil rights attorneys and organizations who argue
in favor of increased privacy, and to judges who must decide whether a privacy right has been
violated. The concept of privacy constantly changes and evolves. Moreover, it is highly
subjective. Scholars agree that it is difficult to offer one robust conceptualization of privacy
(Acquisti, 2004; Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005; Acquisit et al., 2015; Altman, 1976; Gormley,
1992; Nissenbaum, 2004; Prosser, 1960; Solove, 2002; and Westin, 2003). Scholars also agree
that understanding privacy is important to society (Altman, 1976; Nissenbaum, 2004; Solove,
2002; and Westin, 2003) and as technology and communication change, further research
regarding privacy is necessary (Petronio, 2002). The results of this study indicate that people
may be willing to give up privacy rights in exchange for security and that attitudes about
government surveillance are influence more by the threat of terrorism than by privacy concerns.
This information is important to people who are trying protect privacy in the United States and
illustrates that the fear of terrorism may negate privacy concerns.
Cognitive Dissonance
Another purpose for this study was to investigate whether cognitive dissonance, more
specifically the level of dissonance felt while reading a fear appeal, is related to the EPPM
variables and whether dissonance can predict message acceptance or rejection. As hypothesized,
dissonance was related to the individual EPPM variables. Dissonance had statistically significant
relationships with fear, perceived response efficacy and perceived self-efficacy. Unexpectedly,
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there was no correlation between dissonance and perceived threat susceptibility and severity,
suggesting that reading about a threating topic does not, on its own, lead to an increase in
dissonance. The rest of the results were as expected. As fear increased, dissonance also
increased, and those who had a lower perception of self and response efficacy had a greater
feeling of dissonance. It is logical that an individual will feel dissonance when reading a message
suggesting that the person has little or no efficacy to combat a threat. Moreover, research
suggests dissonance can “arise from exposure to an attitude-challenging news source or
information” (Metzger et al, 2015, p. 5). This study found further evidence of this proposition.
The hypothesis that, when isolating the government surveillance efficacy group, dissonance
increased as attitudes toward government surveillance decreased, was supported. In other words,
when participants who had negative attitudes regarding government surveillance read an article
about increased government surveillance, they were more likely to feel dissonance. This is in line
with the proposition that reading information challenging personal beliefs will lead to mental
discomfort (Metzger et al, 2015).
The results indicated that dissonance was minimally related to message acceptance. As
other scholars have suggested, perceived efficacy explained more of the variance in danger
control than perceived threat (Roskos-Ewoldsen, et al, 2004; Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers,
2000). Here, efficacy explained 71 percent of the danger control variance, while threat explain
three percent of the variance. Dissonance explained only .3 percent of the danger control
variance. Perceived response efficacy and self-efficacy mediated the influence of dissonance on
danger control. Taken together, fear, threat and efficacy explained 76 percent of the danger
control variance, and dissonance did little to increase that percentage.
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This study found a strong relationship between dissonance and fear control. As
dissonance increased, the participant was more likely to reject the fear appeal message. In
addition, two of the EPPM’s variables, perceived threat severity and response efficacy mediated
the influence of dissonance on fear control. Interestingly, the results indicated that dissonance
was a better predictor of fear control than the other EPPM variables. As noted previously,
research suggests that perceived threat is a better predictor of fear control than efficacy (RoskosEwoldsen, et al, 2004). The results of this study suggest that is true, but also that dissonance is a
better predictor of fear control than perceived threat. Perceived threat predicted only seven
percent of the variance in fear control, while, when controlling for the other variables,
dissonance predicted 30 percent of the variance. This finding illustrates that a feeling of mental
discomfort could lead a person to more readily reject a fear appeal message. These results
suggest that dissonance is an important variable when investigating and predicting fear control. It
must be noted that all of the EPPM variables and dissonance combined explained only 37
percent of the fear control variance, which suggests that additional variables or group of
variables may help to better predict fear control.
Clearly, dissonance is an important factor when attempting to persuade using fear
appeals, especially in regard to message rejection. Dissonance did play a role in motivating
participants to choose the fear control route. Witte et al. (1998) suggests that fear is a strong
motivator and that when people perceive a serious threat, people will be desperate to take some
sort of action to reduce their fear. In addition, the level of efficacy determines whether that
person gravitates to danger control or fear control (Witte et al. 1998). The results of this study
further suggest that dissonance plays a role in whether someone is motivated to choose the fear
control route. Thus, a better EPPM model may be the following:
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Figure 8. The extended parallel process model (Maloney et al., 2011)
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Like EPPM, the above theoretical model suggests that perceived threat and perceived
efficacy continue to have the primary influence on whether a person is motivated toward the
danger control process, and fear still leads to fear control. However, dissonance has been inserted
as a new variable that may also lead to the fear control process. The results suggested that
dissonance was a much better predictor of message rejection than fear. Under this model, it is
possible that fear could lead to dissonance, which would then lead to defensive motivation, or
dissonance can motivate a person to head directly to defensive motivation, bypassing fear.
These results speak to what factors lead to a successful persuasive message. If the author
of the fear appeal wants the reader to be motivated to choose the danger control route and not
fear control, then dissonance needs to be taken into consideration. This may be particularly
important when dealing with issues where there is already a preexisting, heightened level of
threat or fear. For example, efficacy is more likely to predict the danger control process (Roskos-
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Ewoldsen, et al, 2004; Floyd, Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). However, when dealing with
issues that cause a preexisting high amount of fear, the efficacy content in a message has little to
no impact on the danger control process. In that type of situation, dissonance may play a key role
in whether a fear appeal is effective.
However, even in other instances, dissonance needs to be considered when formulating a
fear appeal. Research suggests that the “management” of dissonance can be particularly
important when trying to reach audiences (Westerwick et al., 2013, p 445). According to
Westerwick et al. (2013), “if users anticipate viewing attitude-challenging content, they may first
bolster their pre-existing attitudes and then explore other perspectives” (p. 445). A bolstering of
pre-existing attitudes could have an effect on persuasion. Another issue to consider is that it is
not just the substantive information in the fear appeal that could lead to dissonance. Dissonance
can result from a dislike or distrust of the source of the message (Metzger et al. 2015). Thus,
when drafting a fear appeal, the author needs to consider the primary audience the message is
attempting to persuade. The source of the fear appeal and how it is worded should be carefully
formulated to appeal to the specific audience because cognitive dissonance could result in
rejection of the message.
These results speak to the broad future use of EPPM. The theory is widely used in health
communication, where persuasion is often viewed in a positive light. For example, persuasive
messages can help keep people safe by advocating for the use of condoms, vaccines and making
healthy choices. The results in this study are not, however, advocating for persuasion to be used
to convince people to give up privacy rights. Rather, this study investigated whether fear appeals
work the same way in a privacy situation as they do in a health communication situation. Finding
that the fear appeals in this study did not lead to message acceptance is not an unsatisfactory
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result. It could be that people view the efficacy options in health communication (i.e. putting on
a condom) as a different sort of choice than giving up privacy rights. For privacy advocates, the
more concerning finding is that individuals care more about security than privacy. The results of
this study suggest that the danger may not be that people can be persuaded to give up privacy
rights, but rather, that people will make that choice on their own in exchange for safety.
Dissonance, Privacy Concern and the Privacy Paradox
This study proposed that there would be a relationship between privacy concern and
cognitive dissonance. In addition, post hoc analyses examined the relationship between cognitive
dissonance and the privacy paradox.
There was no support for the hypothesis that, when looking only at the government
surveillance efficacy groups, there would be a positive relationship between privacy concern and
dissonance. The theoretical foundation for this hypothesis combined the theory of cognitive
dissonance and a conceptualization of privacy (i.e. freedom from surveillance) (Solove, 2002). It
is logical that if someone with a high privacy concern reads an article about increased
government surveillance, that person would feel dissonance. The lack of support for this
hypothesis could be because it was an analysis of a subgroup of the sample. Because all the
experimental stimulus articles pertained to some sort of government interaction and
communication with individuals, either through contacting the authorities or allowing increased
government surveillance, a post hoc analysis was conducted on the entire experimental sample to
examine the relationship between dissonance and privacy concern. The results showed a weak
positive relationship, suggesting that as concerns about privacy increased, dissonance also
increased. This finding is in line with the theoretical foundation created by combining privacy
and dissonance theories. It offers support for the proposition that dissonance can occur when a
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person is exposed to belief-challenging information. In other words, as an individual becomes
more concerned about protecting private information and less welcoming to opening a line of
communication with the government, that individual will feel dissonance when reading an article
about sharing private information with the government to help fight terrorism. As previously
explained, dissonance plays a role in whether someone is motivated toward fear control. Thus, if
a fear appeal is to be successful, the relationship between dissonance and reading beliefchallenging information needs to be considered.
A final post-hoc hypothesis focused on the privacy paradox and its relationship to
dissonance. The hypothesis, which was supported, proposed that privacy concerns and intentions
to allow government surveillance would predict dissonance. Cognitive dissonance, an
inconsistency between attitudes and intentions or behaviors, and the privacy paradox, an
inconsistency between attitudes toward privacy and intentions or behaviors regarding privacy,
are likely related. Theoretically, it is probable that people who display a privacy paradox also
feel cognitive dissonance. For example, if a person with a high privacy concern intended to allow
increased government surveillance, that person should feel dissonance because of the
discrepancy between attitude and intentions. The results of this study support that proposition.
These results lead to the question: How do people who exhibit a privacy paradox find
consistency? Festinger (1957) suggests that when individuals feel dissonance, they will try to
alleviate that dissonance in some fashion, likely by changing either their attitudes or behaviors.
The privacy paradox is an inconsistency that has been clearly documented (Acquisti, 2004;
Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005; Acquisti, Brandimarte & Loewenstein, 2015), and it appears to be
persistent. Festinger (1957) recognizes that some types of dissonance may never end, resulting in
a constant struggle for some sort of consistency. The privacy paradox could be one of those types
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of inconsistencies. Perhaps people recognize the inconstancy and are constantly striving to
resolve the discrepancy. Another explanation could be that people use psychological distortions
such as hyperbolic discounting and immediate gratification (Aquisti, 2004) to trick their minds
into believing that there is no inconsistency. For example, people may discount the future cost or
risk of sharing private information, or they may deem the benefit of sharing the information more
rewarding than the cost. These types of psychological distortions help to explain the privacy
paradox and could offer individuals a resolution to dissonance, even if the resolution is illusory.
It could also be that the inconsistency is never resolved because people are unable to recognize
that their behaviors and attitudes regarding privacy are conflicting. Aquisti (2004) states:
Whenever we face privacy sensitive decisions, we hardly have all data necessary
for an informed choice. But even if we had, we would be likely unable to process
it. And even if we could process it, we may still end behaving against our own
better judgment. (24)

If no inconsistency is detected, dissonance may not be recognized for what it is, and there would
be no effort to reach resolution. A more concerning answer is that a person who exhibits a
privacy paradox many eventually resolve the inconsistency by changing his or her attitude
toward privacy, and perhaps, become willing to give privacy up. Finally, it must be considered
that privacy means different things to different people. Altman and Petronio (2002) both
recognized that technology has an effect on privacy concerns. As technology evolves, privacy
does as well, and each person’s privacy needs are different. It could be that the privacy paradox
is the result of trying to place everyone into a privacy box in which some people simply do not
fit. Future research focusing on dissonance and the resolution of the inconsistency created by the
privacy paradox would help provide a full explanation to this issue.
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What the results of this study make clear is that concerns about privacy and the intent to
allow government surveillance can predict dissonance, which suggests that dissonance and the
privacy paradox are related. Future research is necessary to further investigate this relationship.
It is possible that the privacy paradox is an example of dissonance. If that is the case, then the
issue of how the inconsistency is resolved is an important question that needs to be answered.
The most concerning explanation would be that people resolve the inconsistency by simply
letting go of their privacy beliefs, which could eventually lead to the extinction of privacy rights.
Future research focusing on the privacy paradox and dissonance should provide further
explanations. Understanding the privacy paradox can help us to understand why people make
decisions about sharing private information and if/why people are willing to give up privacy for
security. Answers to these questions are important to businesses and advertisers that want people
to share private information for a benefit, but these answers are also critical to legislators who
make privacy laws, attorneys who argue for privacy rights, and judges who make legal privacy
decisions.
Limitations and threats to validity
There were some limitations to this study. Although research indicates that online
samples are diverse and good quality (Buhrmester et al., 2011), they are not generalizable to the
general public. Further, although Qualtrics assured the researcher that a general population
random sample would be close to equal parts men and women, that was not the case in this
study. Nearly 80 percent of the participants were women. In addition, most of the participants
were white. Controlling for race and gender showed no significance between the groups.
However, a more diverse sample would have been preferred because diversity in samples is
considered a desirable trait in quantitative research (Buhrmester et al., 2011).
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Because this study uses experimental methods, there were some threats to validity. The
experiment ran from January 13, 2007 to January 19, 2007. A week before the experiment ran,
on January 6, a gunman opened fire at a Florida airport, killing five people. Because this event
happened near the time of the experiment, it is possible that the perceived threat level pertaining
to terrorism was higher than it might normally be. Furthermore, it is possible that the perceived
threat of terrorism is always high in today’s society. Research suggests that when a pre-existing
threat exists, fear appeals may not be effective (Muthusamy et al, 2009). With the perceived
threat so high, it is difficult to determine if any type of fear appeal could be effective. In addition,
this study did not ask the respondents about their fear of terrorism. Future research is necessary
to determine how high the fear of terrorism is in the United States and how that fear affects the
persuasiveness of fear appeals.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and future research
This study explained the linkage between privacy, government surveillance and national
security. Scholars offer several conceptualizations for privacy (Altman, 1976; Nissenbaum,
2004; Solove, 2002; and Westin, 2003), and one of those is being free from surveillance. This
study used that conceptualization of privacy in its analysis. U.S. citizens have a constitutional
right to be free from warrantless searches by the government. When overbroad surveillance
techniques pick up the online conversations of people who are not under investigation, that
privacy right is violated. The reasons set forth by the government for conducting surveillance of
communications is for the protection of national security. The connection of these concepts
helped to drive the experimental portion of this study.
This study also sought to investigate privacy through a series of analyses, which included
testing whether a fear appeal can persuade respondents to feel favorably toward increased
government surveillance using the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), investigating the
relationship between privacy concerns and attitudes toward increased government surveillance,
and examining the privacy paradox and how it is related to dissonance. In addition, this study
tested whether dissonance is related to fear appeals and persuasion.
EPPM proposes that fear appeals can be used as a persuasive technique to motivate the
reader of the message to take a certain action that will benefit the reader in some way. The theory
tends to be used in the study of health communication to promote positive and healthy habits.
This study tested EPPM outside of the health communication context to examine if fear appeals
can persuade people to give up privacy rights in exchange for better security. The results suggest
that the threat of terrorism was too high for a fear appeal to have a persuasive effect on people’s
attitudes and intentions. This finding offers further evidence that, for a fear appeal to be
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effective, the level of perceived efficacy must overcome the level of perceived threat. The results
also offer evidence that fear appeals may be ineffective when pre-existing threat levels are high.
Further research about the level of fear regarding terrorism in the United States can help to
determine whether a pre-existing fear is disturbing the effectiveness of the fear appeals. This
study also found evidence that cognitive dissonance is related to the EPPM variables. Dissonance
is a better predictor of message rejection than fear, threat and efficacy combined. Because of the
predictive power of dissonance, it is a variable that should be included in the EPPM model. This
is particularly important when a higher perception of threat already exists. The results also
indicated that efficacy is the best predictor of danger control. These results are evidence of the
importance of efficacy in a fear appeal. Those who are seeking to influence with fear appeals
need to investigate the threat level of an issue and how severe the threat is to the readers of the
fear appeal. The influencer then needs to consider the efficacy options available to the readers.
Only those efficacy options that are strong enough to overcome the perceived threat level will
provide for an effective fear appeal. The influencer must also consider the readers’ feelings
toward the efficacy options, because if the readers feel dissonance when exposed to the fear
appeal, they may be more likely to navigate toward fear control. These are important
considerations that can help advance the effectiveness of fear appeals, particularly in the field of
healthcare where the acceptance of efficacy options such as condom use can prevent the spread
of contagious diseases.
Although research suggests that fear appeals are useful in the field of healthcare, there is
also danger in using fear as a persuasive tool. A focus of this study was to discover whether fear
appeals could be used to persuade people to give up privacy rights and allow increased
government surveillance. This study did not find support for that hypothesis, but the results
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suggest that if the efficacy is manipulated in a way that enables the audience’s efficacy level to
surpass the high threat level, persuasion will likely take place. In other words, if the level of
efficacy people feel regarding increased government surveillance is raised so that it surpasses the
threat of terrorism, there is a likelihood that people can be persuaded to give up their privacy
rights. For privacy advocates, this is concerning news because it means that people may be
persuaded to give up privacy rights if a fear appeal is sufficiently manipulated.
Surprisingly, this study did not find a relationship between privacy concern and attitudes
toward government surveillance. Attitudes toward government surveillance were the same no
matter if the respondent had a high or low privacy concern. Overall, attitudes toward government
surveillance were neutral, with a mean of 4.41 out of seven. Importantly, there was a relationship
between perceived threat and attitudes toward government surveillance. The study found that as
the threat of terrorism increased, attitudes toward government surveillance became more
favorable. Taken together, these results suggest that perceived threat, and not privacy concern,
influenced attitudes toward government surveillance. This is important information for
constitutional lawyers. The legal test used to prove the government has invaded a person’s
Fourth Amendment right to privacy is: an actual expectation of privacy that society would
consider reasonable. The effectiveness of this argument depends on what society recognizes as a
reasonable expectation of privacy. If society begins to favor security over privacy, constitutional
attorneys could encounter serious problems with meeting the legal standard for Fourth
Amendment privacy. In other words, if society begins to believe that in order to keep people
secure the government should be able to monitor private communications, then according to the
Fourth Amendment privacy legal standard, society would no longer recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy in personal communications. This would open an avenue for the
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government to monitor private communications without having to overcome the Fourth
Amendment hurdle. Because of advancements in technology, society’s expectations of privacy
continue to evolve. There is evidence that after the terror attacks of 2001, understandings
regarding privacy have become muddled as people strive for security (Petronio, 2002). It is
critical for constitutional lawyers to keep abreast of changes in privacy concerns and understand
how privacy is perceived by society today.
In addition, this study found that the privacy paradox can help to explain why
respondents with a high privacy concern had nearly the same attitudes toward government
surveillance as respondents with low privacy concerns. The privacy paradox suggests that people
are willing to give up privacy in exchange for a benefit. In this case, there is evidence that
respondents with a high level of privacy concern are willing to give up that privacy in favor of
security. These results are again significant for constitutional lawyers because they indicate that
people are willing to relax their expectations of privacy in exchange for security, which could
suggest a shift in society’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Future research into terrorism and
privacy could help to further determine the effects of the privacy paradox.
It is also clear that the privacy paradox and cognitive dissonance are related. It is likely
that people who display a privacy paradox encounter cognitive dissonance. The theory of
cognitive dissonance suggests that, to alleviate an inconsistency, a person will either change their
beliefs or their actions. An analysis of dissonance and the privacy paradox together would
suggest that people who encounter a privacy paradox are constantly struggling for consistency,
and at some point, will likely change their beliefs or attitudes. This could mean that as people
seek security, they will be more willing to change their beliefs that privacy is important. Future
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research involving dissonance and the privacy paradox could help to explain how or if the
inconsistency is resolved.
Finally, more research needs to be conducted to truly understand what privacy means to
society. It is not clear that privacy means the same thing to every person. As such, the privacy
paradox could be the result of trying to place people into privacy categories where they do not
fit. Future research that delves deeper into how people feel about privacy and government
surveillance could offer a more in-depth explanation. Understanding what privacy means to
society is important for attorneys, lawyers, judges, legislators and scholars. It can be critical in
proposing new national security legislation and making legal arguments about Fourth
Amendment privacy.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Measures
Each participant was asked 80 questions: 6 items for threat; 14 for efficacy; 6 for fear; 9
for cognitive dissonance; 10 for attitudes toward government surveillance/individual reporting; 3
for future intentions; 11 for fear control; 8 for privacy concern; 6 for attitudes toward the U.S.
government; 1 for cyber-theft and 6 for demographics.
1) Items for Perceived Threat Susceptibility
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

It is likely that I will be affected by terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It is possible that I will be affected by terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am at risk of being a victim of terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am at risk of being affected by terrorism

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2) Items for Perceived Threat Severity
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

I believe the risk of terrorism is serious.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I believe the risk of terrorism is significant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I believe the risk of terrorism is severe.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3) Items for Perceived Self-Efficacy (Broken down by efficacy option)
a. Government surveillance
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
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I am able to allow increased government surveillance in order
to prevent terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Allowing increased governmental surveillance is easy to do in
order to prevent terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Allowing increased governmental surveillance to prevent
terrorism is convenient.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

b. Individual reporting
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

I am able to report suspicious activities to law enforcement in
order to prevent terrorism

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Reporting suspicious activity to law enforcement is easy to do
in order to prevent terrorism

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Reporting suspicious activity to law enforcement to prevent
terrorism is convenient.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4) Items for Perceived Response Efficacy (Broken down by efficacy option)
a. Government surveillance
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

Governmental surveillance works to prevent terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Governmental surveillance is effective in preventing terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If I allow increased governmental surveillance, I am less likely
to be affected by terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Increased governmental surveillance, is important to combat
the threat of terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

b. Individual reporting
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

Individual reporting of suspicious activity to law enforcement
works to prevent terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Individual reporting of suspicious activity to law enforcement
is effective in preventing terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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If I report suspicious activity to law enforcement, I am less
likely to be affected by terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Individual reporting of suspicious activity is important to
combat the threat of terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5) Items for Fear
How did this article make you feel about terrorism?

1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)

Frightened

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Tense

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Nervous

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Scared

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Anxious

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Uncomfortable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6) Items for Cognitive Dissonance
To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

I regret reading this news story.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I disliked reading this news story because it challenged my
beliefs.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I agree with the stance taken in this article (reverse coded)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I felt uncomfortable while reading this news story.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

This story made me question my own beliefs about terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I enjoyed reading this news story (reverse coded).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

The topic of the article made me feel uncomfortable.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I liked the topic of this article. (reverse coded)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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This story made me question my own beliefs about
governmental surveillance.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

This story made me question my own beliefs about individual
reporting

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7) Items for Danger control (Broken down by efficacy option)
a. Attitudes
i.) Governmental Surveillance
Please rate your attitude toward increasing governmental
surveillance in order to combat terrorism
Bad

Good

Undesirable

Desirable

Unfavorable

Favorable

Not effective

Effective

Not useful
Disapprove

Useful
Approve

ii.) Individual Reporting
Please rate your attitude toward individual reporting of
suspicious activity to law enforcement to combat terrorism
Bad

Good

Undesirable

Desirable

Unfavorable

Favorable

Not effective

Effective

Not useful
Disapprove

Useful
Approve
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b. Intentions
i.) Governmental Surveillance
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

I would consent to increased government surveillance in order
to help prevent terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I would contact my state and federal legislators about
increasing government surveillance in order to help prevent
terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I would allow increased government surveillance in order to
combat terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

7

6

7

ii.) Individual Reporting
To what extent do you agree with the following statement?

1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)

I intend to report suspicious activity to law enforcement in
order to help prevent terrorism.

1

2

3

4

5

8) Items for fear control
a. Defensive avoidance
Please answer the following questions.
When I first heard about terrorism, my initial instinct was to
[not want to/want to] think about terrorism

a.
b.

Not want
Want to

When I first heard about terrorism, my initial instinct was to
[not want to/want to] do something to protect myself from
terrorism

a.
b.

Not want
Want to

b. Message minimization
Please rate the following adjectives about terrorism. The issue
of terrorism is:
Distorted

1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree)

1

2

3

4

5
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Overblown

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Exaggerated

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Boring

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Overstated

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

c. Perceived manipulation
Please rate how you felt about the article. The article was:

1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree)

Manipulative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Misleading

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Exploitative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Distorted

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9) Items for privacy concern
Please respond to the following questions.

1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)

In general, how concerned are you about your privacy while
you are using the Internet?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

In general, how concerned are you about your privacy while
talking on your phone or cellphone?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Are you concerned about people online not being who they
say they are?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Are you concerned about people you do not know obtaining
personal information about you from your online activities?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Are you concerned that an email you send may be read by
someone else besides the person you sent it to?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Are you concerned that you are asked for too much personal
information when you register or make online purchases?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Are you concerned about online identity theft?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Are you concerned who might access your financial records
electronically?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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11) Attitudes toward the U.S. Government
Please rate your attitude toward the U.S. Government

Bad

Good

Untrustworthy

Trustworthy

Dishonest

Honest

Unfavorable

Favorable

Not effective

Effective

Not useful

Useful

Disapprove

Approve

12) Cyber-theft
Have you ever been the victim of cyber-theft or identity theft? Yes____ No_____
Do you know anyone who has been the victim of cyber-theft or identity theft? Yes_____ No____
13) What does Privacy mean to you? _____________________________________
14) Items for Demographics
What is your age?

_______ (Please write in age)

What is your gender?

Male
Female
Other

Please specify your ethnicity/race.

African American
Native American
Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
Other

Are you Hispanic/Latino?

Yes
No

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Some high school, no diploma
High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent
Some college credit, no degree
Trade/technical/vocational training
Associate degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Professional degree
Doctorate degree
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What is your political affiliation?

Democrat
Republican
Independent
Other ___________ (please write in affiliation)
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Appendix B: Fear appeal message
The following are the eight stimuli were used in the experiment. In each stimulus, the
threat/efficacy were manipulated. The base article for the stimuli was taking from a CNN article.
The efficacy portions were manipulated using various online sources that are referenced at the
end of this appendix.
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126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

139

140

141

142

References for Stimuli
Carroll, R. (2015, April 22). “NSA surveillance needed to prevent ISIS attack, claims former
intelligence chair” The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/apr/22/mass-surveillance-needed-isis-attack-mike-rogers.
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Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2015). Global Security Forum 2015: Opening
Session. Retrieved from https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/attachments/151116_GSF_OpeningSession.pdf.
Fox, K., Gilbert, D. (2016, Nov. 16). “Terror attacks in developing world surge 650% in one
year.” CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/16/world/global-terrorismreport/index.html
Gaouette, N. (2016, May 4). “Top U.S. intel official: ISIS can stage Europe-style attacks in U.S.”
CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/04/middleeast/obama-clapper-isisattack-u-s-soil/
Homeland Security. (n.d.). If you See Something, Say Something: About the Campaign.
Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/about-campaign
Nelson, S. (2013, June 18). “NSA Director: Surveillance Stopped 50 Terror Plots.” U.S. News.
Retrieved from http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/18/nsadirector-surveillance-stopped-50-terror-plots.
Reilly, K. (2016, May 4) “Top U.S. Intelligence Official: ISIS Has ‘Capacity’ for Paris-Style
Attack In U.S.” Time. Retrieved from http://time.com/4318165/isis-national-securitythreat-obama/
Sherfinski, D. (2015, June 4). “NSA surveillance prevented terrorist attacks, most voters say:
poll” The Washington Times. Retrieved from http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2015/jun/4/nsa-surveillance-prevented-terrorist-attacks-poll/
Wilber, D.Q. (2016, July 14). “The FBI investigated the Orlando mass shooter for 10 months –
and found nothing. Here’s why.” Los Angeles Time. Retrieve from
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fbi-investigation-mateen-20160712-snap-story.html
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